Placing the Reality of Employment Discrimination Cases in a Comparative Context by Sternlight, Jean R
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
2007
Placing the Reality of Employment Discrimination
Cases in a Comparative Context
Jean R. Sternlight
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at
the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sternlight, Jean R., "Placing the Reality of Employment Discrimination Cases in a Comparative Context" (2007). Scholarly Works.
1173.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/1173
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN ACTION: EXAMINING THE
REALITY OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2007 ANNUAL MEETING,
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, SECTIONS
ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Michelle A. Travis*: Welcome to our panel on Dispute Resolution in
Action: Examining the Reality of Employment Discrimination Cases,
which is jointly sponsored by the AALS Section on Employment
Discrimination and the AALS Section on Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR). I am Michelle Travis, from the University of San
Francisco School of Law. I am the outgoing Chair of the Section on
Employment Discrimination, and I would like to thank the other
Executive Committee Members of our Section: Melissa Hart, from
the University of Colorado School of Law, Sharona Hoffman, from
Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Monique Lillard,
from the University of Idaho College of Law, and Paul Secunda, from
the University of Mississippi School of Law. I would also like to thank
the members of our Annual Meeting Planning Committee for their
help organizing this panel: Miriam Cherry, from Cumberland School
of Law, Minna Kotkin, from Brooklyn Law School, and Joe Slater,
from Toledo Law School.
It has been a pleasure to work with the Section on ADR to plan
this joint panel. I would like to thank the members of the ADR
Section's Planning Committee, as well as the outgoing Chair, Michael
Moffitt, from the University of Oregon School of Law. Most of all, I
would like to thank the incoming Chair of the ADR Section, Andrea
Schneider, from Marquette University Law School. Andrea is an
expert on ADR, negotiation, and international law. Without her hard
work, this panel would not have been possible.
Today, our panel will be exploring the topic of dispute resolution
in employment discrimination cases. In particular, we will be
discussing how employment discrimination cases are handled under a
* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law, and outgoing Chair of the
AALS Section on Employment Discrimination.
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variety of dispute resolution methods, each method's advantages and
disadvantages, how each method affects the development of legal
doctrine, and how well each method advances the goals of efficiency,
fairness, and justice. Our four speakers will be discussing various
dispute resolution processes moving along a spectrum from internal,
to external, to global.
Our first speaker will be Professor Susan Bisom-Rapp, from the
Thomas Jefferson School of Law, where she is the director of the
Center for Law & Social Justice. Susan is an expert on employment
discrimination law, particularly sexual harassment law, as well as
international and comparative employment law in the globalized
workplace. Susan will be discussing recent studies on internal
employer compliance efforts and discrimination grievance programs.
Our next two speakers will move our discussion beyond the
borders of the firm to talk about external ADR programs. First will
be Doctor and Professor E. Patrick McDermott, from the Franklin P.
Perdue School of Business of Salisbury University. Pat is an expert on
ADR in the workplace, particularly on the EEOC's mediation and
conciliation programs, which will be focus of his remarks today. He
will be followed by Professor Michael Green, from Texas Wesleyan
School of Law. Michael is an expert on employment discrimination
law, employment and labor law, and ADR. His work has focused in
particular on analyzing the effects of workplace ADR on a variety of
racial justice issues. Michael will be discussing recent developments in
employment discrimination arbitration.
Our final speaker will move our discussion one step further to
consider what lessons may be learned by looking at the ADR
methods that other countries use to resolve employment
discrimination disputes. That speaker is Professor Jean Sternlight,
from the William S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada,
Law Vegas, where she is the Director of the Saltman Center for
Conflict Resolution. Jean will be focusing in particular on comparing
the ADR approaches in the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Australia.
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HOW WELL DO INTERNAL EEO ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION AND LITIGATION PREVENTION MEASURES
ADVANCE THE TRADITIONAL GOAL OF ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION LAW?
Susan Bisom-Rapp*:
ADR traditionally encompasses a range of mechanisms for
settling disputes short of litigation. More specifically, ADR processes
such as mediation, arbitration, neutral evaluation, and facilitation
endeavor to keep disputants out of the courtroom.
In the employment discrimination area, resolving disputes
without litigation has significant appeal. After all, lawsuits are
lengthy, expensive, and perhaps most importantly, can be psychically
damaging to litigants. On the latter point, sociologists Bob Nelson
and Laura Beth Nielsen are conducting a study, The Genesis and
Development of Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, which
involves, among other things, interviews with parties involved in
federal discrimination filings.' One of their tentative findings, sure to
give employee advocates pause, is that many successful plaintiffs
remain gravely disappointed because their suits failed to yield what
they really wanted: reinstatement to jobs they loved.2
Employers, motivated by the monetary and temporal costs of
litigation, and the desire to signal compliance with antidiscrimination
* Professor of Law, Director, Center for Law and Social Justice, Thomas Jefferson
School of Law. This essay is based on a presentation given at the January 2007 Association of
American Law Schools Annual Meeting. The author and the thoughts expressed herein
benefited from participation in a research working group entitled, "Social Scientific Perspectives
on Employment Discrimination in Organizations," which is part of the Discrimination Research
Group, a joint effort funded by the American Bar Foundation, the Center for Advanced Study
in the Behavioral Sciences, and the Ford Foundation (grant #1045-0189). Thanks to Frank
Dobbin, Laurie Edelman and Laura Beth Nielsen for comments on the manuscript.
1. See generally American Bar Foundation, Robert L. Nelson, Director & Senior
Research Fellow, Current ABF Projects, <http://www.abf-sociolegal.org/resnelson2.html> (last
visited June 11, 2007) (describing Bob Nelson with Laura Beth Nielsen, The Genesis and
Development of Employment Discrimination Lawsuits); see also Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert
L. Nelson, Scaling the Pyramid: A Sociolegal Model of Employment Discrimination Litigation, in
HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 3-34
(Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005) (outlining the contours of Nielsen's and
Nelson's research).
2. See E-mail from Laura Beth Nielsen, Research Fellow, American Bar Foundation,
Assistant Professor of Sociology and Law, Northwestern University, to Susan Bisom-Rapp,
Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law (Dec. 9, 2006) (on file with author); E-mail
from Susan Bisom-Rapp, Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, to Laura Beth
Nielsen, Research Fellow, American Bar Foundation, Assistant Professor of Sociology and
Law, Northwestern University (Nov. 14, 2006) (on file with author).
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law, have developed policies and practices designed to prevent
workplace litigation. Although we typically think of ADR as
involving a third-party neutral, for this talk, I consider employer-
adopted, internal equal employment opportunity (EEO) compliance
mechanisms as forms of ADR and dispute prevention. And, relying
on studies by social scientists, I want to discuss some possible
yardsticks for evaluating the effectiveness of these structures.
Socio-legal scholars have amply documented the spread of a slew
of organizational structures in the wake of passage of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) 3 and Executive Order 11246 in
1965.4 These compliance mechanisms, none of which were initially
mandated by formal law, include non-union grievance procedures and
disciplinary hearings,' in-house EEO offices, sexual harassment
grievance procedures,' formal performance evaluation and salary
classification , and diversity training programs.! The structures, which
I classify as litigation prevention devices, seek to prevent disputes
from occurring, or at least where they do occur, from being
conceptualized as caused by discrimination."o They are self-regulatory
mechanisms that aim to prevent and resolve disputes internally,
without resort to litigation.
Although there is an impressive literature documenting the rise
and spread of EEO policies and procedures, and this author has for
some time warned that they may promote cosmetic rather than
substantive compliance," much less is empirically known about their
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
4. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 567 (1964-1965).
5. Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The
Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. Soc. 1401 (1990); John R.
Sutton et al., The Legalization of the Workplace, 99 AM. J. Soc. 944 (1994).
6. Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational
Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. Soc. 1531 (1992).
7. Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures
as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. Soc. 406 (1999).
8. Frank Dobbin et al., Equal Opportunity Law and the Construction of Internal Labor
Markets, 99 AM. J. Soc. 396 (1993). These mechanisms were initially adopted in response to
1930s federal labor legislation and federal labor market controls adopted during World War II.
See id. at 422.
9. Lauren B. Edelman & Stephen M. Petterson, Symbols and Substance in Organizational
Response to Civil Rights Law, 17 RES. SOC. STRATIFICATION & MOBILITY 107 (1999).
10. See generally Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance
in Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 959 (1999).
11. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of
Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment
Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2001); Susan Bisom-Rapp, Discerning
Form from Substance: Understanding Employer Litigation Prevention Strategies, 3 EMP. RTS. &
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effectiveness. Some recent social scientific studies, however, are
instructive. Before reviewing them, we should pause for a moment to
consider the measures one might use to assess the utility of these
employment discrimination ADR and litigation prevention structures.
ADR mechanisms can of course be evaluated using conventional
measures such as the length of time it takes claimants to resolve
disputes, the substantive outcomes produced in dollar amounts, or
claimant satisfaction. Many of the procedures described above,
however, were adopted in an effort to purge discrimination from the
workplace. Thus, I will argue that we should also be concerned with
how well these EEO policies and procedures promote a traditional
goal of antidiscrimination law: removing artificial barriers that limit
the progress of underrepresented groups. In other words, I think we
need to determine whether internal ADR and litigation prevention
devices, over time, lead to a bettering of the position of women and
people of color within organizations. This measure is particularly
salient given the important work done in the last decade by
employment discrimination scholars who focus on the structural,
institutional and/or cultural aspects of bias and argue for creative,
non-litigation-oriented solutions to these subtle yet pernicious
phenomena. 12
The study that most closely, yet ultimately inconclusively, speaks
to my concern is one published recently by sociologists Alexandra
Kalev, Frank Dobbin, and Erin Kelly." Using changes in the
representation of women and minorities in management as the
measure of organizational success, the study reviewed data on EEO
structures in 708 work establishments from 1971-2002.14 The team
approached the subject a little differently than I do today. Rather
than conceptualizing the organizational mechanisms as designed to
prevent discrimination litigation, Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly assessed
them as structures that purport to promote diversity.
Seven common types of diversity programs were examined to
determine the effect they have on the workforce representation of
EMP. POL'Y J. 1 (1999).
12. See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001); see generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural
Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2006) (describing the
structural movement and expressing skepticism about the proposals offered).
13. Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of
Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 AM. Soc. REV. 589 (2006).
14. Id. at 596.
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traditionally underrepresented groups. Those mechanisms were:
affirmative action plans, diversity committees, diversity managers,
diversity training, diversity performance evaluations for managers,
networking programs, and mentoring programs." The programs fall
into three broad categories: 1) those that establish accountability for
diversity, 2) those that seek to reduce bias through training or
feedback, and 3) those that attempt to enhance the social connections
of women and minority workers.16
Some of the details of the study are especially revealing. For
example, firms adopting diversity training programs actually see a 7
percent decline in the odds of black women achieving management
status.17 Employers evaluating managers on the basis of their
performance in promoting diversity are likely to see slight increases in
the percentages of white women entering management but also an 8
percent decline in the chances for black men.8 Mentoring programs
appear to increase the representation of African-American women in
management, leaving other underrepresented groups untouched. 9
Networking programs seem to work for white women but produce a
decline in the chances for black men.20 In contrast, those programs
establishing accountability for diversity outcomes - affirmative action
plans, diversity committees, and diversity managers - experience
diversity increases across of the board. 2 ' These programs, argue the
study authors, establish organizational responsibility for the changes
necessary to realize a diverse workforce.22
While helpful in beginning to identify the types of EEO
compliance mechanisms that are likely to promote substantive change
as well as symbolic adherence to antidiscrimination norms, the study
did not report results for two common forms of internal anti-
discrimination ADR: non-union grievance procedures and sexual
harassment grievance procedures. I would be surprised, however, to
find that either has much impact on managerial demographics. I do
have some basis for my opinion in addition to the fact that I know
15. Id. at 590.
16. Id. at 591.
17. Id. at 604.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. The authors note, however, that in manufacturing - computers, electronics, and
transportation - affirmative action plans produce negative effects for black women. Such plans
in service - retail, insurance, and business services - result in positive effects for the group.
22. Id. at 611.
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Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly looked at but have not published findings
21
on the diversity effects of sexual harassment grievance procedures.
Given that a goal of their research is to identify effective diversity-
promoting mechanisms, I assume that if the procedures produced
tangible diversity outcomes they would report that fact.
Further support for my assertion may be found in a separate
study published after this presentation but before these remarks went
to press. In that study, Professors Dobbin and Kelly paint an
intriguing description of how and why sexual harassment grievance
procedures came to be adopted as mechanisms to protect employers
from sexual harassment liability.24 Their review of the spread of
harassment procedures among 389 employers, along with a literature
review spanning 1977-1997, establishes that this form of ADR was
conceptualized and promoted by personnel professionals as a
bureaucratic solution to manage risk in the face of legal uncertainty.
Although members of the legal profession were initially reluctant
to proffer a strategy to stave off harassment lawsuits, human
resources professionals exaggerated the risk of suit and vigorously
advocated grievance procedures as an inoculation to protect
employers. These devices were recommended even though there was
no evidence that they would actually be accepted by courts as a
defense.26 Moreover, the programs were billed more as shields from
litigation than devices to reduce workplace harassment.2 7 In the face
of Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly's findings that diversity enhancing
structures are those that establish organizational accountability for
change, it seems highly unlikely that sexual harassment grievance
procedures would affect the workplace representation of women and
people of color. There is certainly no evidence that they do.
Indeed, today there is scant evidence of judicial concern that the
devices even prevent harassment. A forthcoming study of federal
judicial decisions between 1965 - 1999 by Professors Lauren
Edelman, Linda Krieger, and their colleagues tentatively concludes
that district courts are increasingly likely to view the presence of
23. E-mail from Frank Dobbin, Professor of Sociology, Harvard University, to Susan
Bisom-Rapp, Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law (Dec. 10, 2006) (on file with
author).
24. Frank Dobbin & Erin Kelly, How to Stop Harassment: Professional Construction of
Legal Compliance in Organizations, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1203 (2007).
25. Id. at 1205.
26. Id. at 1209-12.
27. Id. at 1237.
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grievance procedures as relevant in harassment cases, and to defer to
them without scrutiny.28 In other words, many judges seem to care
only that the procedures be there but not care whether they work.
Viewed against the traditional goal of removing barriers to the
progress of underrepresented groups, it appears the role of sexual
harassment grievance procedures is often ceremonial rather than
substantive. And yet this form of ADR is widely viewed as an
employment best practice. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a
statement more aligned with the sentiments of the Society for Human
Resource Management than the legislative history of Title VII,
recently described the civil rights statute as designed to encourage
"the creation of anti-harassment policies and effective grievance
mechanisms. ,2
Why are such EEO ADR procedures looked upon so favorably?
What keeps us from evaluating them against traditional Title VII
goals? In my time remaining, I can only briefly sketch out two
possible answers to my queries. First, I think an over-commitment to
procedural justice eclipses attention to substantive outcomes. Fair-
looking procedures are often inaccurately conflated with non-
discriminatory working conditions.0 This phenomenon affects
employees subject to the procedures, corporate administrators
charged with overseeing the procedures, and those outsiders - in
litigation judges and juries - charged with evaluating procedural
efficacy.
Second, I believe that in their day-to-day functioning, such
procedures become imbued with what Professor Lauren Edelman
calls "managerial logic.""1 For example, Edelman, Howard Erlanger,
and John Lande's study of internal ADR procedures for handling
discrimination complaints found that the personnel specialists
responsible for administering the processes imposed on the systems
the goal of good managerial practice rather than that of racial and
gender equality.32 They were not concerned with individual rights and
28. Lauren B. Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to
Institutionalized Employment Structures 37 (June 21, 2006) (unpublished paper on file with
author).
29. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 145 (2004).
30. Susan Bisom-Rapp et al., A Critical Look at Organizational Responses to and Remedies
for Sex Discrimination, in SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE: MULTIDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES 273, 274-78 (Faye J. Crosby et al., eds., 2007).
31. Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 106
AM. J. SOC. 1589 (2001).
32. Lauren B. Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil
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remedies. Instead, they recast most disputes as individual personality
clashes rather than instances of possible discrimination.3 3 The
procedures allowed for the venting of frustrations but were not
designed to search for bias or to alter the status quo.34 One might even
argue that in giving voice to complainants, treating them with respect,
and restoring workplace harmony, the procedures make it easy for
claimants and decision-makers to remain oblivious to any biases that
may be operative.
Harmony, respect, and voice are important attributes that
litigation is ill-suited to deliver. Those interested in eliminating
discrimination and diversifying the workplace, however, must own up
to the fact that resort to many internal ADR and dispute prevention
structures will render those goals elusive if not impossible to attain. If
we want these structures to be as just in substance as they appear in
form, we must be willing to look at outcomes. In other words, we
must collect and assess real evidence of achieved results and balance
competing goals accordingly.
E. Patrick McDermott*:
I. INTRODUCTION
I have been the principal researcher on three studies of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) mediation program.
The breadth of data and findings from these studies cannot be
covered in the time today, and so I will focus on some key findings
from each. In discussing the EEOC mediation program it should be
noted that a true understanding requires an understanding of the
quality, or lack thereof, of the EEOC charge investigation process.
This topic is not before the panel today, so a holistic analysis will have
to wait for another day.
II. How ARE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CHARGES HANDLED
UNDER THE EEOC PROGRAM?
The EEOC charge intake procedure classifies charges as "A,"
"B," and "C" charges. "A" charges are considered important for
Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 497, 515-16 (1993).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 526-28.
* Associate Professor, Franklin P. Perdue School of Business, Salisbury University.
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public policy or other agency reasons and not eligible for mediation;
the EEOC prefers that these charges remain in the traditional charge
investigation and litigation procedure. "B" charges are those where
there may be merit but there is no public policy basis to keep these
cases for investigation and litigation. C charges are those that the
intake procedure identifies as not having merit on their face. The B
charges are those that are eligible for mediation. The EEOC claims
that it offers mediation on close to all B charges. If both parties
accept, then the mediation is scheduled. Either an internal mediator
or external "contract" mediator mediates the case. Most mediations
are for one day and they average about four hours.35
III. WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF THIS MEDIATION PROGRAM?
A. The First Study
Our first study was an overall evaluation of the program from the
vantage point of the Charging Parties and Respondents.36 Our survey
obtained the feedback from 1683 Charging Parties and 1572
Respondents. Thus, this is one of the most comprehensive surveys of
mediation participants ever conducted and the largest of that era.
Our results were good news for the EEOC. Overall, participant
feedback regarding the EEOC mediation program indicated that the
program was, by any measure, clearly acceptable to the charging
parties and respondents who participated in it. We considered both
procedural justice and the distributive justice elements of the
mediations.
Some key findings included:
* Regarding the "voice factor," an essential element of
procedural justice, an overwhelming majority of the
participants felt that they had a full opportunity to
35. See [Binder 1] EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA), 0:3901-0:3903 (stating that mediation
proceedings are commonly completed in one session, lasting from one to five hours); EEOC
Website, Questions and Answers About Mediation, <http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/mediation
qa.html> (last modified July 17, 2006) (stating that mediations usually last for about three to
four hours).
36. This full study can be found on the EEOC's website. E. PATRICK MCDERMOTT ET AL.,
EEOC ORDER No. 9/0900/7632/2, AN EVALUATION OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION MEDIATION PROGRAM (2000), available at <http://www.eeoc.
gov/mediate/report/index.html> (last visited June 7, 2007).
37. Executive Summary, in id., available at <http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/report/summary.
html>.
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present their views during mediation.38
* 91 percent of charging parties and 96 percent of
respondents indicated they would be willing to participate
in the mediation program again if involved in another
EEOC proceeding."
* The participants expressed strong satisfaction with the
information they received about mediation from the
EEOC prior to their attendance at the mediation session
and also reported that they felt very strongly that they
understood the process after the mediator's introduction
41
of the process.
* The vast majority of the participants agreed that their
mediation was scheduled promptly.4 1
* The participants were very satisfied with the role and
conduct of the mediators. They felt strongly that the
mediators understood their needs, helped to clarify their
needs, and assisted them to develop options for resolving
the charge. 42 They felt even more strongly that the
procedures used by the mediators were fair. 43 The
questions regarding the neutrality of the mediators
elicited some of the strongest responses from the
participants, who felt that the mediators were neutral not
only in the beginning of the process, but also remained
44
neutral throughout the process.
Participant satisfaction with the distributive elements of
mediation was more tempered than their satisfaction with the
procedural elements. That said most were satisfied with the results of
the mediation and believe that the mediation was "fair." 4 5
Participant satisfaction with the EEOC mediation program
remained high even when the participant responses differed, at times,
based on the nature of the charges, such as the statute, basis, and
issue, and the characteristics of the mediation session, such as
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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representation, mediator type, and mediation status.46
B. The Second Study
Our second study examined the Mediator's perspectives on the
mediation process.4 7 Here mediators discussed the party and party
representatives' conduct that they observed as contributing or acting
as a barrier to the resolution of the dispute. One of the most
interesting areas of this research was our probe into the tactics the
mediators self-reported as using to bring the parties to agreement. We
learned that while the EEOC sought to have a "facilitative"
mediation program the reality was that both evaluative and
facilitative conduct were found in the mediations.' This was
important because in that era of mediation, many scholars were
arguing that one could maintain a pure model.4 9 Others even claimed
that evaluation was not mediation." We found a much more eclectic
environment, one discussed by Jeffrey Stempel and others, in this
then popular debate." This also raised interesting issues such as the
propriety of advertising a process as facilitative without the
underlying reality, potential issues such as the effect of mediator
persuasion on unrepresented or less powerful parties, the question of
whether our data revealed a particularly successful mediation style,
and how to train mediators and advocates given the reality of this
process.
We then performed a study for the California Department of
Fair Employment and Housing which measured many of the same
program processes as discussed in our first and second EEOC studies.
We found many comparable results that we discussed in our paper."
46. Id.
47. This study can also be found at the EEOC website. E. PATRICK MCDERMOTr ET AL.,
ORDER NO. 9/0900/7623/G, THE EEOC MEDIATION PROGRAM: MEDIATORS' PERSPECTIVE ON
THE PARTIES, PROCESSES, AND OUTCOMES (Aug. 1, 2001), available at <http://www.eeoc.
gov/mediate/mcdfinal.html> (last visited June 7, 2007).
48. Mediator Conduct that Facilitates Resolution, in id., available at <http://www.eeoc.gov
/mediate/mcdfinal.html#III-C-5>.
49. See e.g. Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and
Recognition? The Mediator's Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REV. 253
(1989); Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin's Grid, 3
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71 (1998); Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should
Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (1997); Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative
Mediator Orientations: Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985 (1997).
50. See, e.g., Kovach & Love, supra note 49; Love, supra note 49.
51. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Identifying Real Dichotomies Underlying the False Dichotomy:
Twenty-First Century Mediation in an Eclectic Regime, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 371.
52. E. PATRICK MCDERMOTT ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF THE CALIFORNIA
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C. The Third Study
Our third study looked at why employers declined to participate
in the mediation process. This study was insightful in that it
established that most employers do not refuse to mediate due to any
prejudices concerning the EEOC or the mediation process but rather
because they believe that the charge before the EEOC is meritless
and they are not concerned about an EEOC investigation.54
D. Additional Research
We continued to analyze various aspects to gain further insight
into the mediation process. My talented colleague Dr. Ruth Obar and
I were able to provide additional insight into the EEOC mediation
process which we reported in the Harvard Negotiation Law Journal."
We discovered interesting byproducts from the type of tactics that the
mediators reported using in the mediations. First, we found that the
participants were more satisfied with the conduct of mediators who
use a facilitative approach.56 Second, we found that the average dollar
amount of the settlement was higher with mediators using evaluative
tactics and that the range of possible settlement amounts was greater
with an evaluative mediator." In other words, the facilitative mediator
delivered a compressed range of settlements. We deemed this
phenomenon "Feel Good vs. More Money."" Third, charging parties
with representation on average obtained much more money in
settlements. We deemed this the "Critical Role of Representation in
Mediation." 9
DEPARTMENT OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING PILOT MEDIATION PROGRAM, available
at <http://www.dfehmp.ca.gov/News/PMP%20Eval%2004%20Evaluation.doc> (last visited
Apr. 10, 2007).
53. This can also be found at the EEOC website. E. PATRICK MCDERMOTT ET AL., AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE REASONS FOR THE LACK OF EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION IN THE
EEOC MEDIATION PROGRAM, available at <http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/study3/index.html>
(last visited June 7, 2007).
54. Executive Summary, in id.
55. E. Patrick McDermott & Ruth Obar, What's Going On in Mediation: An Empirical
Analysis of the Influence of a Mediator's Style on Party Satisfaction and Monetary Benefit, 9
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 75 (2004).
56. Id. at 97-98.
57. Id. at 101.
58. Id. at 107-08.
59. Id. at 107.
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IV. CONCLUSION: WHERE Do WE GO FROM HERE?
While our research has highlighted the various successes of the
EEOC program, I strongly believe that the EEOC should not rest on
its laurels but rather seek to continually improve this program. I
recommend that the EEOC consider the following. First, EEOC
personnel and mediators have advised me that the EEOC's
preoccupation with settlement statistics can affect the overall quality
of the program. For example, mediation may only be offered in cases
where the EEOC District Office believes it can get a settlement. Such
a selection process, that preordains certain disputes as eligible
because they are guaranteed to settle while discriminating against
other cases that may be tougher to mediate, may fail to provide the
benefits of the EEOC program to a wide range of parties. Don't get
me wrong - the convening process should screen out cases that are
obviously not ready for mediation at the pre-investigation phase.
What I am saying is I suspect that there are many cases that would
benefit from mediation but that are denied this process because the
EEOC District Offices are more concerned with statistics than
providing mediation where the parties may not settle. And when I
say, "may not settle," I mean settle at that mediation where the
EEOC can document settlement and obtain statistical credit.
This devotion to high settlement rates raises other serious
questions.
* First, if the key measurement of "success" for the
program at the District Office level is the settlement rate,
does internal EEOC staff push settlement on a party to
maximize their statistics even when settlement may not
be appropriate? Here there are two statistical
measurements at issue. The first is the one measuring the
settling of cases. The second is the overall statistical
measure of the EEOC case investigations and
resolutions. Suffice it to say that the EEOC measures
settled mediations the same as for full investigations and
probable cause findings, so that a weak investigatory arm
that seldom makes probable cause findings due to shoddy
investigations could be shielded by the overall mediation
settlement statistics.
* Are unrepresented parties misled or pressured into
thinking that the settlement that they have is a good
deal?
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* Is the convening process used to anchor a particular party
or frame the case in such a way that the party is misled as
to the true parameters of settlement?
* If external mediators believe that they will be selected for
more cases if they have high settlement statistics, is it
possible that they will twist the arm of the weaker party
or otherwise push settlement when it may not be
appropriate?
* Does the pressure to resolve cases cause mediators to
push settlement in mediations where it becomes clear
that, if the Charging Party is correct about certain
existing evidence, the value of the case is much greater
than the settlement range at the present?
A related question is how external mediators are compensated. If
they are paid a fixed dollar amount per mediation, do these mediators
have an external financial incentive to pressure a party to settle as
soon as possible, instead of allowing the element of time to be used
for an effective resolution? Does this compensation make it more
difficult for a mediator to resolve a more complex case that is fully
resolvable but only with the time, patience, and range of mediator
skills needed for a more complex case?
Another flaw in relying on settlement statistics is that the EEOC
sells itself short. The reliance on settlement statistics ignores
mediations that often produce "min-wins" where the parties later
settle the case outside the auspices of the EEOC. For example, the
EEOC mediation may effectively frame the key issues and facts and
bring the parties close to a settlement. When the settlement is
reached later, the EEOC does not know whether the mediation
contributed to the resolution. The EEOC simply does not measure
this success.
The EEOC may be denying parties the opportunity to participate
in a mediation that is beneficial to the resolution of the dispute
because they are overly concerned with booking immediate
settlement statistics. I believe the EEOC would benefit from looking
into this particular issue, as I think they will find that they should be
getting more credit for resolution of disputes that they have recorded
as not resolved at mediation, and that some of their District Offices
may be running their program for statistical success and not in the
best interests of the public. Thank you.
1532007]
154 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 11:139
RUMINATIONS ABOUT THE EEOC'S POLICY REGARDING
ARBITRATION
Michael Z. Green*:
I. INTRODUCTION: A DECADE AFTER THE EEOC'S POLICY
STATEMENT AGAINST ENFORCEMENT OF EMPLOYER-MANDATED
ARBITRATION
In 2007, several milestones have arisen regarding the intersection
of federal employment discrimination law and ADR including the ten
year anniversary of a policy statement issued by the EEOC.6 0 In its
policy statement issued on July 10, 1997, the EEOC, the federal
agency charged with enforcing the key statutes that regulate
workplace discrimination,6 1 specifically addressed the impact of
mandatory arbitration of employment discrimination claims.62 That
* Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. I am grateful to Susan
Ayres and Carol Brown for making suggestions that significantly improved this essay. I
appreciate the financial support provided by the Texas Wesleyan University School of Law and
the student research assistance provided by Anca Adams, Chris Baumann, Sandra Cortes, and
Chris Norris.
60. See generally Richard A. Bales, Normative Consideration of Employment Arbitration at
Gilmer's Quinceailera, 81 TUL. L. REV. 331 (2006) [hereinafter Bales, Normative Consideration]
(describing events over the last fifteen years regarding enforcement of arbitration agreements
signed as a condition of employment and covering statutory employment disputes). Typically,
with arbitration, the parties select a neutral outsider as the final decision maker to resolve their
dispute. This differs from other ADR methodologies, like mediation, where typically the neutral
outsider is not a decision maker and only helps the parties craft their own resolution. Although
there are other forms of ADR that may more resemble arbitration versus mediation or vice
versa, the focus of this essay will be on arbitration as defined along with some mention of
mediation as defined.
61. See Laws Enforced by the EEOC, <http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/laws.html> (last visited
Mar. 15, 2007) (referring to the following laws, among others, that the EEOC enforces: Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (EEOC enforcement authority codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4,
e-5, e-12) (2000)); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) (EEOC
enforcement authority codified at 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000)); and Title I of the Americans With
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) (EEOC enforcement authority codified at 42 U.S.C. § 121116
(2000)).
62. See EEOC NOTICE NO. 915.002: POLICY STATEMENT ON MANDATORY BINDING
ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES AS A CONDITION OF
EMPLOYMENT (July 10, 1997) [hereinafter, EEOC POLICY], available at <http://www.
eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.html) (last visited Mar. 15, 2007). For a more critical analysis of
this policy, see Beth M. Primm, Comment, A Critical Look at the EEOC's Policy Against
Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 151 (1999). But see
Joseph D. Garrison, The Employee's Perspective: Mandatory Binding Arbitration Constitutes
Little More Than A Waiver of A Worker's Rights, DISP. RESOL. J., Fall 1997, at 15 (arguing that
the EEOC's position opposing mandatory arbitration was well-deserved); see also Ellen J.
Vargyas, EEOC Explains Its Decision: Verdict On Mandatory Arbitration In Employment, DISP.
RESOL. J., Fall 1997, at 8, 10 (describing further the EEOC's explanation of the policy).
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1997 policy statement recognized that "[a]n increasing number of
employers are requiring as a condition of employment that applicants
and employees give up their right to pursue employment
discrimination claims in court and agree to resolve their disputes
through binding arbitration."63
While being "[]mindful of the case law enforcing specific
mandatory arbitration agreements, in particular, the Supreme Court's
decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane,""' the Commission still
found "that such agreements are inconsistent with the civil rights
laws."6 Unfortunately, with additional changes in the law and still
many unanswered questions about the use of arbitration, the EEOC
has failed to clarify or amend its 1997 policy statement. Despite
reaching its fortieth anniversary in 2005, questions abound about
whether the EEOC matters.66
However, only five years ago, the Supreme Court made it clear
that the EEOC matters when the issue involves the application of
mandatory arbitration agreements to resolve statutory employment
discrimination claims.67 In EEOC v. Waffle House, the Court
recognized the significant role the EEOC plays because it has the
statutory mandate to vindicate the public interest in eradicating
workplace discrimination regardless of any agreement between an
employer and its individual employees to arbitrate statutory claims.68
The Supreme Court's 2002 acknowledgment in Waffle House of the
EEOC's important role in enforcing employment discrimination laws,
and how that role prevails over mandatory arbitration agreements,
signaled a major opportunity for the EEOC to update and clarify its
1997 policy statement.
In this Essay, I assert that the EEOC has failed in its
responsibility to enforce employment discrimination laws by not
advancing its position against mandatory arbitration since the 1997
policy statement. The EEOC failed to even make a change to clarify
63. EEOC POLICY, supra note 62, § I.
64. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
65. EEOC POLICY, supra note 62, § I.
66. See Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why the EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 671, 702-03 (2005) (acknowledging that the issue of whether the EEOC
matters still "arises" even after four decades of existence and asserting that the EEOC still
"play[s] an irreplaceable role in the battle to eradicate employment discrimination"); Michael
Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency's Role in Employment Discrimination
Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 5-11 (1996) (discussing the impact of the EEOC).
67. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
68. Id. at 291-92.
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its 1997 policy after a major opportunity to address arbitration arose
from the Supreme Court's broad holding in the Waffle House decision
in 2002. The EEOC has thereby ignored its obligation to play a major
role in setting policy regarding employment discrimination on such an
important topic, mandatory arbitration. This inaction also prevented
the EEOC from using the Waffle House decision as a springboard to
clarify further its policy on arbitration. Furthermore, by not setting
any policy on arbitration since 1997, and sending mixed messages
about the continued vitality of the 1997 policy, the EEOC has allowed
mandatory arbitration to operate in a vacuum, given the lack of legal
clarity. Only neutral arbitration service providers have acted to
prevent employers from overreaching by requiring minimal
procedures necessary to protect victims of workplace discrimination
in the arbitral forum.6 9 Meanwhile, those employers and employees
who desired more guidance on the arbitration issues that have
evolved since 1997 had to seek court resolution without knowing the
EEOC's position on the matter. In 2007, the question of how
arbitration may effectively resolve employment discrimination
matters may have reached a crucial convergence where continued
failure by the EEOC to take a position may not bode well for any
ongoing use of arbitration. And because arbitration has potential as a
fair dispute resolution tool for employment discrimination matters, it
would be a shame to watch that benefit waste away.
This Essay examines the issues related to enforcement of
mandatory arbitration and the EEOC's role in that process. Part II
recounts the events since 1991 regarding arbitration of statutory
69. See Bales, Normative Consideration, supra note 60, at 341 (describing the Due Process
Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes, developed by
several groups representing, employers, employees, and neutral organizations in 1995, and
asserting that "[i]t has been adopted by the major arbitration service providers" who "will
refuse to arbitrate cases under rules inconsistent with the ... Protocol"). For more details about
the Due Process Protocol, see Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at Ten:
Twenty Unresolved Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL.
165 (2005) [hereinafter, Bales, Protocol at Ten]; Leona Green, Mandatory Arbitration of
Statutory Employment Disputes: A Public Policy Issue In Need of A Legislative Solution, 12
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB POL'Y 173, 211-221 (1998). Due Process Protocols have
addressed broad application of arbitration agreements beyond just employment but to
consumer transactions as well. See generally Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due
Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 369, 369-70 (2004) (describing the impact of
the Protocols in employment and consumer dispute resolution).
70. Although neutral service providers have operated under the strictures of the Due
Process Protocol, several challenging issues have developed, including many concerns that the
drafters never contemplated, to which the lower courts have not provided consistent answers.
See Bales, Normative Consideration, supra note 60, at 341; Bales, Protocol at Ten, supra note 69,
at 184-85.
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employment discrimination claims that led to the EEOC's 1997 policy
and also resulted in the 2002 Waffle House decision. Part III
highlights some of the issues that employees and employers are
starting to raise about arbitration and how a failed response to their
concerns threatens the continued use of arbitration in resolving
employment discrimination disputes. Part III also identifies key
remaining questions that still necessitate some EEOC guidance to
employers and employees.
Part IV explores the possible reasons why the EEOC has not set
a policy on arbitration since 1997 and suggests why the EEOC should
not let those reasons continue to hinder it from clarifying its current
position regarding mandatory arbitration. Legitimate reasons may
exist for the EEOC's failure to clarify its arbitration policy since 1997.
The Essay explores three of those possibilities: first, that the Supreme
Court's rejection of an underlying premise in the 1997 policy
statement (asserting that contracts of employment were not subject to
enforcement under federal arbitration law) ended up forestalling any
momentum towards further arbitration clarification out of fear that
additional EEOC statements might be completely rejected by the
Court; second, that political forces both inside the EEOC and outside
of it caused the inaction; and third, that a major focus on mediation as
an ADR tool brought such positive publicity that efforts to clarify
arbitration became less of a priority.
Part V concludes that the EEOC must take a position on the
current concerns that remain regarding mandatory arbitration. This
responsibility arises not just out of a need to give guidance to
employers and employees but also as a necessary component of the
EEOC's mandate to protect the public interest regarding matters of
workplace discrimination.
II. THE JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYER-MANDATED
ARBITRATION AND THE ROLE OF THE EEOC: FROM GILMER TO
WAFFLE HOUSE
Understanding the development of arbitration for statutory
employment claims and how this form of arbitration has increased
exponentially within the past sixteen years requires an understanding
of how the law has expanded during this period. A number of
circumstances converged in 1991. In that year, landmark changes in
how the law viewed the arbitration of statutory employment
discrimination claims began. Given the relatively short period since
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that major transformation in the law and our understanding today in
2007, a number of questions remain about the scope of arbitration for
employment discrimination claims. Employers and employees still
need to know exactly what is required to allow the arbitral forum to
supplant the judicial forum for these claims. Such questions would
seem to fall right within the province of the EEOC because of its
prominent role in enforcing employment discrimination laws. And the
Supreme Court has already validated the significant role that the
EEOC plays through its statutory mandate to vindicate the public
interest even when that might conflict with other strong federal policy
supporting the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate.
A. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
Before 1991, no employment law practitioner would have
thought it possible that courts would enforce a predispute agreement
requiring arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims.
The fifteen year anniversary just occurred last year in 2006 for the
landmark 1991 decision of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.72
in which the Supreme Court first authorized the use of arbitration for
resolving a statutory employment discrimination claim. As a
condition of his employment as a financial manager for Interstate/
Johnson Lane Corp., the plaintiff in Gilmer had to sign a registration
application with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) which
required that arbitrate any controversy with his employer." Because
he signed the application with the NYSE containing the arbitration
provision, the plaintiff's employer filed a motion to compel
arbitration several years later when Gilmer filed a statutory age
discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA). 74
Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the Supreme
Court in Gilmer compelled the arbitration of the ADEA claim.76 The
Court evaded the question of whether the scope of the provision in
section 1 of the FAA, which excludes "contracts of employment"
71. See Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage From Using
Mandatory Arbitration For Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 408 & n.26 (2000)
[hereinafter, Green, Myth of Employer Advantage].
72. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
73. Id. at 23.
74. Id. at 23-24. The ADEA can be found at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000).
75. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (2000).
76. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
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from FAA coverage, applied to the ADEA claim involving a
discrimination dispute between an employer and an employee.7 The
Court found that the agreement to arbitrate was not part of a contract
of employment between Gilmer and his employer, but instead an
agreement between the NYSE and Gilmer; so the Court saved for
"another day" the question of whether section 1 of the FAA excludes
71
all employment contracts from FAA coverage.
Despite this uncertainty as to whether a direct agreement to
arbitrate between an employer and an employee would be
enforceable under the FAA after Gilmer, employers began to enter
into employment agreements requiring arbitration of any
employment disputes as a condition of employment. These so-called
"mandatory" or employer-mandated predispute agreements to
arbitrate have garnered much criticism over the past fifteen plus years
as employers continued the expansive use of these agreements.79 With
the imprimatur of the Gilmer decision behind them, most lower
courts enforced those mandatory arbitration agreements involving
statutory employment discrimination claims.0 The expansive use of
mandatory arbitration agreements has continued to occur despite
much legal uncertainty about their enforcement shortly after the
Gilmer decision and even with some additional legal uncertainties still
present today as discussed below."
B. Civil Rights Act of 1991
Other forces were also conspiring to create more intersection
concerns regarding employment discrimination and ADR in 1991.
77. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) ("[N]othing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.").
78. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2.
79. See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1631, 1632-34 (2005) [hereinafter Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration] (describing the
level of criticism of mandatory arbitration agreements and their expansive use). There is some
debate about whether the term, "mandatory," appropriately addresses how arbitration occurs,
at least in the consumer setting. See id. at 1632 n.1 (identifying a debate between Professor Jean
Sternlight and Professor Stephen Ware on that issue as to whether arbitration is really
mandatory because consumers do have a choice); see also Bales, Normative Consideration, supra
note 60, at 333 & n.6 (capturing te debate between Professors Sternlight and Ware).
Regardless of the potential distinction, within this essay, the term, "mandatory arbitration" is
used to refer to arbitration of employment discrimination claims when agreed to as an
employer-mandated condition of employment.
80. See Green, Myth of Employer Advantage, supra note 71, at 411 & n.39, 412 & n.42
(citing cases).
81. See infra Part III.C.
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Shortly after the Gilmer decision in May 1991, President George
Herbert Walker Bush signed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA of
1991)82 on November 21, 1991. During its 1988-89 term, the Supreme
Court had decided several controversial cases regarding employment
discrimination matters including: Patterson v. McLean Credit Union;"
Lorance v. AT&T Technologies;" Martin v. Wilks;" Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins;86 and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio." These
decisions, among others decided by the Court that term, caused
concern for civil rights advocates, who mounted a legislative effort to
reverse those decisions, which culminated with the successful passage
CRA of 1991."
Under the new CRA of 1991, Congress granted employees the
right to pursue compensatory and punitive damage claims along with
the right to a jury trial for intentional discrimination claims brought
pursuant to Title VII." These new remedies were included in the
proposed legislation to align Title VII claims with claims under
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,"' which already allowed
such remedies, but only for employment discrimination claims based
on race. 9' Initial legislation drafted to address the civil rights concerns
regarding the 1989 decisions,2 the Civil Rights Act of 1990, failed as
82. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.);
see also <http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/cra91.html> (providing many of the provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991) (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
83. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
84. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
85. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
86. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
87. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
88. See Michael Z. Green, Addressing Race Discrimination Under Title VII After Forty
Years: The Promise of ADR as Interest-Convergence, 48 HOWARD L.J. 937, 949 (2005)
[hereinafter Green, Addressing Race Discrimation]; see also Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A
Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and Resurrection of the Disparate Impact Theory of
Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 431, 467 (2005).
89. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964)
(codified as amended in pertinent part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to 2000e-17 (2004)). The CRA of
1991 contained provisions that expanded Title VII remedies, based on the size of the employer,
for intentional discrimination under Title VII. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§
101-102, 105 Stat. 1071-74 (1991) (codified in pertinent part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a-b (2000))
(describing the right to compensatory and punitive damage remedies and the right to a jury trial
made available to claimants filing claims of intentional discrimination under Title VII, as
amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, but placing caps on recovery of $50,000 for employers
with less than 101 employees and then graduated monetary increases corresponding to the
increasing number of employees in the workforce up to a maximum of $500,000 for employers
with more than 500 employees).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
91. See H.R. Rep. 102-40(I), at 14 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 552-53.
92. See supra notes 83-87.
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President Bush vetoed it because of purported concerns that quotas
would be necessary for employers to protect themselves in light of the
new remedies, along with theories of liability that were proposed.93
The new CRA of 1991 also included a provision encouraging the
use of ADR to resolve employment discrimination claims.9 4 That
provision stated:
Section 118. Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by
law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including
settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation,
factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve
disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law
amended by this title."
The legislative history behind this ADR provision in the CRA of
1991 did not clearly indicate whether Congress was endorsing the use
of arbitration as an agreed condition of employment before a dispute
has arisen or only when agreed to after the dispute has arisen.96 The
ADR provision was drafted before Gilmer as part of the Civil Rights
Act of 1990 when the general understanding was that agreements to
arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims could not
prevent an employee from pursuing resolution in court.97
Thus, a little more than fifteen years ago the uncertainty about
the application of Gilmer to predispute mandatory arbitration
employment agreements was palpable. Nevertheless, employers
93. Belton, supra note 88, at 467 & n.228 (referring to the veto); Reginald C. Govan,
Honorable Compromises and the Moral High Ground: The Conflict Between the Rhetoric and
the Content of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 RUTGERs L. REV. 1, 69, 148-49 (1993); Green,
supra note 89, at 948 n.54 (citing to a comment on the EEOC's website regarding its fortieth
anniversary and referring to two reasons that were articulated as the basis for President Bush's
veto of the 1990 legislation: "first, the reversal of [the analysis for] business necessity, and
second, the right to jury trial with compensatory and punitive damages for intentional
discrimination"). A few commentators have provided a detailed discussion of the failed 1990
civil rights legislation. See, e.g., Leland Ware, The Civil Rights Act of 1990: A Dream Deferred,
10 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 1 (1991); Cynthia L. Alexander, Note, The Defeat of the Civil
Rights Act of 1990: Wading Through the Rhetoric in Search of Compromise, 44 VAND. L. REV.
595 (1991).
94. Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074 (1991)
(codified as a note at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000)), available at <http://www.eeoc.gov
policy/cra9l.html> (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
95. Id.
96. See Sara Lingafelter, Comment, Lack of Meaningful Choice Defined: Your Job vs. Your
Right to Sue in a Judicial Forum, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 803 , 821-26 (2005) (describing analysis
and legislative history of the ADR provision of CRA of 1991, Section 118, found at 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (statutory note)). But see EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 753
(9th Cir. 2003) (finding the language in the ADR provision to be unambiguous and thus having
no need to resort to meaning from legislative history suggesting that the ADR provision in
Section 118 of the CRA of 1991 was only intended to have a post-dispute application).
97. Lingafelter, supra note 96, at 823.
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began to use these mandatory arbitration agreements as a condition
of employment. Because the new statutory regime from the CRA of
1991 now offered jury trials along with punitive and compensatory
damages for claims of intentional discrimination, employers greatly
feared large and unpredictable jury verdicts would start to affect
resolution of employment discrimination claims.98 Accordingly,
employers enthusiastically embraced the use of arbitration after
Gilmer by requiring that their employees agree to arbitrate
employment discrimination claims as a condition of being employed. 9
In a recent study conducted by the Cornell Institute on Conflict
Resolution, the researchers analyzed "200 field interviews on conflict
management with managers and attorneys in nearly sixty U.S.
corporations."" From that study of the motivations of managers and
attorneys in using ADR, "interviewees hardly ever uttered the word
'fairness"' and "almost always reported that their major motivation
was to avoid the costs associated with resolving disputes in court."'o'
C. The EEOC's 1997 Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration
As the number of cases involving arbitration of statutory
employment discrimination claims increased after Gilmer, the EEOC
addressed the implications of using mandatory arbitration. As a
result, approximately ten years ago in July 1997, the EEOC issued its
policy statement on mandatory binding arbitration of employment
discrimination disputes as a condition of employment.' 02
In its 1997 policy statement, the EEOC clarified its position to all
those who were unsure about the parameters of pursuing mandatory
98. See Frederick L. Sullivan, Accepting Evolution in Workplace Justice: The Need for
Congress to Mandate Arbitration, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 281, 317 (2004) ("Much of the
advocating for arbitration on the part of employers results from verdicts that have been pursued
before sympathetic-to-employee and hostile-to-employer juries in proceedings that have
become known as 'workplace lotteries."') (footnote omitted); see also David T. Lopez, Realizing
the Promise of Employment Arbitration, 69 TEx. B. J. 862, 62 (2006) ("Employers have opted
for mandatory, binding arbitration of employment disputes as a way to avoid the fear of
disproportionate jury awards or jury bias, among other reasons").
99. Green, Myth of Employer Advantage, supra note 71, at 454-59 (describing concerns
about jury verdicts - albeit based on little data - as the concern for employers that led the rush
into the use of arbitration).
100. See David B. Lipsky, Resolving Workplace Conflict: The Alternative Dispute Resolution
Revolution and Some Lessons We Have Learned, PERSPECTIVES ON WORK, Winter 2007, at 11,
12 & n.3 (citing DAVID LIPSKY ET AL., EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING WORKPLACE
CONFLICT: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN CORPORATIONS FOR MANAGERS AND DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROFESSIONALS (2003)).
101. Id. at 13.
102. EEOC POLICY, supra note 62.
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arbitration agreements after Gilmer. The 1997 policy statement also
provided arguments in support of its position.'" Professor Richard
Bales has interpreted the EEOC Policy to include eight reasons for its
opposition to mandatory arbitration including: 1) inability to develop
judicial precedents; 2) lack of deterrent effect because arbitration
awards are not published; 3) limited judicial review which prevents
courts from correcting any arbitrator errors of statutory
interpretation; 4) waiver of the right to a jury trial; 5) the availability
of only limited discovery; 6) the structural advantage the employer
has as a repeat player in the selection of the arbitrator and potential
influence on the arbitrator due to the possible need to select the
arbitrator for future cases; 7) improper influence by the employer as
the party with the most bargaining power in drafting one-sided
agreements; and 8) inability of the EEOC to perform its role if
employees are not able to file charges.'" In the policy statement, the
EEOC ultimately concluded that mandatory arbitration agreements
for employment discrimination claims should not be enforced.105
The fact that the EEOC took this position in 1997 was not
surprising given the Commission's longstanding opposition to the use
of arbitration even if case law might differ with the EEOC's
position.' 6 The EEOC had already issued a policy statement in 1995
opposing the use of mandatory arbitration agreements as a condition
of employment.' So the 1997 statement merely "reiterated [the
EEOC's] opposition to mandatory arbitration agreements and
restated its commitment to challenging the legality of these
agreements in the courts, even in cases where the employee has
agreed to abide by such a contract."'o
Regardless of differences between the courts and the EEOC's
position on an issue,"o compliance with the complexities of
103. Id.
104. See Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Arbitration and the EEOC, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 20-
26 (1999) [hereinafter Bales, Compulsory Arbitration].
105. EEOC POLICY, supra note 67, § 1.
106. Primm, supra note 62, at 151 (noting that it was "not surprising" for the EEOC to come
up with a policy statement on mandatory arbitration at that time).
107. See Mark Hansen, Contract Disputes: EEOC Reaffirms Policy Favoring Judges Over
Arbitrators For Workplace Discrimination Claims, A.B.A.J., Sept. 1997, at 26, 26.
108. Id.
109. Although beyond the scope of this essay, Professor Rebecca Hanner White has stressed
the importance the courts should give to the EEOC's role in setting policy and the deference
courts should give to the EEOC's interpretations regarding key policy issues. See, e.g., Rebecca
Hanner White, Deference and Disability Discrimination, 99 MICH. L. REV. 532 (2000); Rebecca
Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy: Recognizing the
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employment discrimination law can be difficult,"o and employers still
tend to look to the EEOC for guidance on how to comply with the
complexities of employment discrimination law."' Also, employees
look to the EEOC to help explain what protections are available to
them under the law.'12 Small businesses, not looking to spend the time
and resources needed to challenge the EEOC's position, will likely
use the EEOC's position on the matter to guide them in developing
compliance policies.1 3 As one commentator has suggested, the
EEOC's "guidances and policies... can serve as a model and
comparison for less effective corporate policies."114
D. Wright v. Universal Maritime Services Corp.
A year after the 1997 EEOC policy statement, another case came
Agency's Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 51.
110. See Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing Employment
Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1468-82 (2004)
[hereinafter Sternlight, In Search of Best Procedure] (suggesting that the following ten factors
make individual employment discrimination claims difficult to resolve: complex laws; highly
contested and confusing facts; involvement of significant non-legal as well as legal interests;
societal need for correct determinations; societal need for clear and public precedents to guide
future conduct and deter future misconduct; the need for adequate compensation of victims of
discrimination; the societal need to punish wrongdoers; unavailability of a fair procedural
mechanism to assert claims; the need for quick resolution of claims to allow parties to move
forward with their lives and business; and the lack of resources alleged victims tend to have
compared to the alleged perpetrators); Susan Sturm, Lawyers and the Practice of Workplace
Equity, 2002 WIs. L. REV. 277, 277-82 (noting that workplace inequities are becoming more
complex and moving to a "second generation" requiring unique collaborative problem-solving
skills).
111. See Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 1937, 1953-54 (2006) (highlighting the complexities of the statutes that the
EEOC administers; asserting how the EEOC has developed necessary expertise on various
related subjects involved in enforcement; and describing numerous policy guidance materials
that the EEOC generates commensurate with its responsibility to track tendencies and be a
"repository for a wealth of information about the discrimination-related trends and concerns in
workplaces around the country"); Primm, supra note 62, at 160 (referring to employer guidance
given by the EEOC). The EEOC lists more than twenty different policies and guidances for
employees and employers to consider on its website including its policy against mandatory
arbitration. See Enforcement Guidances and Related Documents, <http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/
guidance.html> (last modified Mar. 7, 2007).
112. Hart, supra note 111, at 1953-54 & n.95 (highlighting how employees can learn from the
many guidance materials created by the EEOC to help understand some of the complexities of
the law).
113. The EEOC even targeted small business compliance as the purpose for upgrading its
website in 1999 to make its guidances and policies more available and to present them in a more
user friendly format. See Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Revamps Website (July 9, 1999),
available at <http://www.eeoc.gov/press/7-9-99.html>. More information targeted for small
business is available on the EEOC's website. See Information for Small Businesses,
<http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/smallbusinesses.html> (last modified Feb. 13, 2001).
114. Adele Rapport, Using EEOC Enforcement Guidelines and Policy Statements, in 2
ATLA 2005 TORONTO ANNUAL CONVENTION PAPERS 2021 (2005).
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to the Supreme Court, Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp."'
In that case, the Court addressed the issue of whether an agreement
for mandatory arbitration of a statutory employment discrimination
claim would be enforceable in a union setting involving a collective
bargaining agreement." The Court decided that any union waiver of
an individual employee's statutory right to pursue a discrimination
claim in a judicial forum must be a clear and unmistakable.
The significance of Wright relates to a pre-Gilmer precedent
from a 1974 Supreme Court decision. In Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co.,"' the Court found that an employee could pursue any
individual claim he had under Title VII in court even if he had
already used the grievance and arbitration process provided by the
employer and his union pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement.1 1 9 According to the Court, by processing the employee's
grievance through arbitration, the union had not waived the statutory
rights of the employee to file a Title VII claim.' 20 The Court also
found that a union cannot agree to waive an individual employee's
future pursuit of statutory rights in court.121 In the Wright decision's
analysis of the requirement that a union must effectuate a clear and
unmistakable waiver of its members' statutory rights to file in court,
the Court failed to explain whether the Gilmer decision had overruled
the Alexander decision.
A number of courts have been uncertain about how to apply the
Wright decision and determine whether a union has effectively made
an unmistakable waiver of its employees' rights to pursue statutory
claims in court, especially if the collective bargaining agreement
contains anti-discrimination language.1 2 2 It is unlikely that a union
115. 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
116. Id. at 72.
117. Id. at 79-80.
118. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
119. Id. at 50 (finding that "[t]he distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory
rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the same factual
occurrence. And certainly no inconsistency results from permitting both rights to be enforced in
their respectively appropriate forums.").
120. See id. at 51-52.
121. Id. at 51. The Court subsequently banned prospective waivers by a union of an
individual employee's rights under other statutes in McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S.
284, 292 (1984) (banning waivers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)) and Barrentine v. Ark.-Best
Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981) (banning waivers under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2000)).
122. Compare Rogers v. New York Univ., 220 F.3d 73 (2000) (finding that a clear and
unmistakable waiver can occur only when the collective bargaining agreement: 1) contains a
provision whereby employees specifically agree to submit all federal causes of action arising out
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would agree to provide a "clear and unmistakable" waiver of any
individual employee's right to take his or her employment
discrimination dispute into court.123 But that may depend upon how a
clear and unmistakable waiver is defined, as Wright only said that
there was no proof of such a waiver in that case.124
Many had hoped or expected that Wright would address the
unanswered question about whether agreements to arbitrate made
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement would be subject to the
mandates of Gilmer. The Supreme Court in Wright at least
established that there are differences between agreements to arbitrate
when made in a union setting but it muddled the boundaries of
Gardner-Denver and Gilmer by not identifying what might constitute
a clear and unmistakable waiver and whether a union can even make
this waiver prospectively or before a dispute arises. Until further
court explanation, the EEOC should clarify its policy when unions
and collective bargaining arbitration are involved, since Wright arose
after the 1997 EEOC policy and many questions remain about how to
reconcile Gilmer, Alexander, and Wright.125
of employment to arbitration, or 2) language explicitly incorporating the statutory anti-
discrimination laws into the agreement to arbitrate) with Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d 306
(4th Cir. 2001) (finding that general anti-discrimination provision in collective bargaining
agreement was enough to waive employees' statutory right to pursue employment
discrimination claims in court).
123. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor's Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1767, 1842
(2001) (asserting that "unions will have a powerful disincentive to negotiate for
antidiscrimination provisions in labor contracts because they risk waiving unit members' rights
to proceed in court with statutory antidiscrimination claims").
124. See generally Martin H. Malin & Jeanne M. Vonhof, The Evolving Role of the Labor
Arbitrator, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 199, 221-25 (2005) (discussing court decisions and
analysis related to compelling arbitration of statutory claims pursuant to provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement while acknowledging that most courts refuse to compel
arbitration of statutory claims but a significant minority of courts are starting to compel them).
125. A number of commentators have raised concerns about the difficulties that arise when
unions must face the prospects of dealing with their obligations in the context of a statutory
employment discrimination dispute. See, e.g., Crain & Matheny, supra note 123, at 1841-45; Ann
C. Hodges, Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the Unionized Workplace: Is Bargaining with the
Union Required?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 513, 516-20 (2001); Eugene Scalia, Ending
Our Anti-Union Federal Employment Policy, 24 HARV. J. L. PUB. POL'Y 489, 498 (2000); see
also Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrating Sexual Harassment Grievances: A Representation Dilemma
for Unions, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 9 (1999) (identifying conflicts for unions in pursuing
the collective interests of the membership versus individual claims of employees alleging
discrimination claims); Ann C. Hodges, Strategies for Combating Sexual Harassment: The Role
of Labor Unions, 15 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 183, 226 (2006) (suggesting opportunities for unions
even in non-union workplaces to help deal with employment disputes); Mary K O'Melveny, One
Bite of the Apple and One of the Orange: Interpreting Claims That Collective Bargaining
Agreements Should Waive the Individual Employee's Statutory Rights, 19 LAB. LAW. 185 (2003)
(asserting that unions should not be allowed to waive individual employee rights to statutory
discrimination claims because of the conflicts posed) Ronald Turner, Employment
Discrimination, Labor and Employment Arbitration, and the Case Against Union Waiver of the
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E. Circuit City v. Adams
At the time of the 1997 EEOC position statement, many
questions were outstanding including one of the key issues that the
Gilmer decision had not answered. That question was whether the
FAA (the source of law for enforcing the agreement to arbitrate in
Gilmer)2 6 even applied when employers and employees directly
contracted for arbitration. 27 Language in Section 1 of the FAA
seemed to support the argument that "contracts of employment"
were not covered by the FAA.'" Accordingly, for a decade after
Gilmer, there was still a debate regarding whether the strong
endorsement of arbitration of statutory employment discrimination
claims under the FAA encompassed agreements entered into directly
between employers and employees as part of a contract of
employment.
The 1997 EEOC policy statementl29 supported the position that
contracts of employment should not be covered by the FAA. The
EEOC's position probably deterred some employers from pursuing
such agreements or at least gave them some input about the risks
involved in adopting these agreements. But the question that the
Gilmer decision "saved for another day" finally saw that day come ten
years later in 2001 when the Supreme Court decided Circuit City v.
Adams.3 o
In Circuit City, the Court held that contracts of employment were
subject to coverage under the FAA, and only a very narrow group of
employees, those who literally work in commerce, would have their
contracts of employment not subject to enforcement under the FAA.
Individual Worker's Statutory Right to a Judicial Forum, 49 EMORY L.J. 135, 201-03 (2000)
(same). But see Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform: Opening Up
the Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827, 845-47 (1996) (asserting that
unions should be able to waive individual employees' Title VII claims in an agreement with an
employer because, without that waiver, the prospect of allowing employees essentially another
chance to adjudicate their claim discourages employers from entering into agreements to
arbitrate).
126. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (2000).
127. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991) (describing how
the arbitration agreement was not part of a contract of employment between an employer and
an employee since Gilmer's agreement to arbitrate was with the NYSE, not with his employer).
128. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
129. See EEOC POLICY, supra note 62 (noting that the issue of whether employment
contracts are subject to FAA coverage had not been resolved but also asserting that arbitration
agreements should still not be enforced even if employment contracts involving arbitration
agreements are covered by the FAA).
130. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
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This decision made it very clear that agreements to arbitrate future
employment disputes can be enforceable when entered into directly
between an employer and an employee."' In Circuit City, the
employee plaintiff alleged discrimination and unfair treatment under
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act and under state
tort law.'32 The Court held that Section 1 of the FAA, which excludes
certain "contracts of employment" from FAA coverage, only applied
to contracts of employees who are transportation workers based upon
the Court's interpretation of language related to "workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce."13
The Circuit City decision clearly left the field for mandatory
arbitration of statutory employment disputes wide open. Since the
Gilmer decision in 1991, the Supreme Court has generally supported
and endorsed the arbitration of all forms of agreements including
many not involving employment discrimination matters.3 4 But Circuit
City has granted the strongest authority for employers to feel
comfortable in getting their employees to enter into mandatory
predispute arbitration agreements.
F. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.
Only five years ago in January 2002, the Supreme Court issued
its important decision regarding agreements to arbitrate employment
discrimination claims and the EEOC's role in the enforcement of
those agreements, EEOC v. Waffle House.'35 In this case, the Court
had to decide whether a mandatory arbitration agreement between an
employer and an individual employee precluded the EEOC from
taking the case forward. The Court found that the EEOC could still
file a lawsuit against an employer and obtain individual relief despite
131. Seeid.at119.
132. Id. at 110.
133. Id. at 119.
134. See Buckeye Cash Checking v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v.
Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002); EEOC
v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105
(2001); Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001); Green Tree Fin.
Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine
Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57 (2000); Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866 (1998); Wright
v. Universal Marine Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517
U.S. 681 (1996); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos. v. Dobson,
513 U.S. 265 (1995); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
135. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
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the existence of an arbitration agreement. 16 Also, the Court was
asked to address the question of whether an agreement to arbitrate
limited the EEOC to only pursuing equitable remedies even if the
EEOC was not precluded from taking the case forward.
The empowering Waffle House opinion attests to the importance
of the EEOC's role in enforcing employment discrimination law. The
Supreme Court held that even though the individual employee who
filed the charge had agreed to arbitrate employment disputes, the
EEOC could still pursue a discrimination lawsuit against the
employer for all possible equitable and legal remedies under Title VII
including back pay and reinstatement along with compensatory and
punitive damages.137 This decision highlighted the concern about the
collective public rights that the EEOC must vindicate through its
enforcement policies.138 Because the EEOC is not a party to the
arbitration agreement, it is not bound by the strictures of that
agreement."'9 If the employee has already recovered remedies in
arbitration, any amount received by the employee may limit the final
award issued in the EEOC's court action. 140
Accordingly, under Waffle House, an employer may still end up
in court defending itself and trying to prevent a large jury verdict.
This can occur based upon a charge filed with the EEOC by an
employee who had agreed to arbitrate pursuant to an agreement
made as a condition of employment. The Circuit City decision made it
clear that due to the general policy of favoring arbitration from the
FAA, mandatory arbitration agreements for statutory employment
discrimination claims would be enforceable. But the Waffle House
decision established that the policy of favoring arbitration gives way
to something else: the policy of having the EEOC independently
vindicate statutory rights and enforce its public mandate for the
collective interests of all employees.141
136. Id. at 292.
137. Id. at 297-98.
138. See id. at 290.
139. Id. at 292.
140. Id. at 296. In Gilmer, the Court had made clear that an individual subject to an
arbitration agreement is still free to file an EEOC charge, and that arbitration agreements "will
not preclude the EEOC from bringing actions seeking class-wide and equitable relief." Gilmer,
500 U.S. at 32.
141. See Crain & Matheny, supra note 123, at 1815 n.287 (discussing the implications of
Waffle House and asserting that "[t]he underlying tension in Waffle House is between the
federal pro-arbitration policy and the rights of individuals to contract freely with regard to the
terms of their employment on the one hand, and the public interest in eradicating employment
discrimination on the other" because "[t]he EEOC functions as more than just an enforcer for
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III. EMPLOYER-MANDATED ARBITRATION ISSUES FOR THE EEOC
TO CONSIDER SINCE WAFFLE HOUSE
After the Wright and Waffle House decisions, employers really
have no guarantee that an arbitration agreement will preclude an
employee's claims from getting into court when unions or the EEOC
are involved. The issuance of the Circuit City, Wright, and Waffle
House decisions after the 1997 EEOC policy statement, at a
minimum, would appear to warrant some clarification by the EEOC.
Regardless of the uncertainty about what these cases would mean for
mandatory arbitration, the Waffle House decision signaled the
importance of the EEOC's role in addressing these issues. However,
the EEOC has still not taken any position regarding mandatory
arbitration in the five years since Waffle House nor within the ten
years since its 1997 policy statement.
Instead, when the Waffle House decision was issued, then-EEOC
Chair Cari M. Dominquez stated, "The [Waffle House] ruling
embraces the view that, as the agency entrusted to enforce the federal
statutes prohibiting discrimination in the workplace, the EEOC is not
constrained in any way by a private arbitration agreement to which
the EEOC is not a party." 1 42 Although that statement might have
indicated a new resilience on the part of the EEOC with respect to its
role in addressing arbitration in the workplace and possibly a
wholesale continuance of its 1997 policy against mandatory
arbitration, then Dominguez also made the following comment which
cast doubt about what the EEOC's policy on mandatory arbitration
would now be: "The [Waffle House] decision also acknowledges, as
does the EEOC, the goals of efficiency and economy that may be
furthered in particular cases by the private arbitration system." 143
Unfortunately, the EEOC has not articulated any specific details
about what particular cases would be furthered by arbitration and
how that agreement to arbitrate would arise.
Shortly after the Waffle House decision, some commentators
asserted that "Waffle House's most significant effect on employers is
that it strips them of the finality that was once achieved through ...
individual employee rights against discrimination, it is the watchdog for the public's interest"
and "the EEOC makes resource allocation decisions about which claims it will pursue based on
its assessment of the most significant impact for workers as a whole").
142. See Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Comments on Supreme Court Ruling in Waffle
House Case (Jan. 15, 2002), available at <http://www.eeoc.gov/press/1-15-02.html> (last visited
Mar. 15, 2007).
143. Id.
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arbitration judgments."m On the other hand, some commentators
have suggested that Waffle House would have little impact on
employer efforts to mandate arbitration as a condition of employment
because the EEOC only takes a small percentage of cases from
charges that get filed.45 Under this approach, the small likelihood of
the EEOC pursuing a case that would have normally been arbitrated
presents little deterrent for employers to resist their continued use of
mandatory arbitration agreements. Therefore, an employer may be
willing to take the risk of using mandatory arbitration agreements
even if the EEOC could still pursue the matter in court. Certainly, up
to the time of the Waffle House decision, employers were increasingly
using arbitration at significant rates. 146 There have been no indicators
that employers, in response to Waffle House, started cutting back on
their arbitration efforts.147
Although the general lack of EEOC cases filed suggests that
Waffle House can have little impact, the real limit on the impact of
Waffle House remains the fact that the EEOC has done nothing to
capitalize on the victory from that decision by clearly articulating its
current policy on the enforcement of employer-mandated arbitration
agreements. The 1997 policy statement provided guidance to many
employees and employers as to how the EEOC would deal with
employer-mandated arbitration in the face of uncertain legal
questions about enforcement of such agreements. Despite many
unanswered questions about the enforcement of arbitration
agreements that still remain, the EEOC has said nothing. Instead, the
EEOC has continued to send mixed messages as to what its
144. See Jason A. McNiel, The Implications of EEOC v. Waffle House: Do Settlement and
Waiver Agreements Affect the EEOC's Right To Seek and Obtain Victim-Specific Relief? 38 IND.
L. REV. 761, 785 (2005) (discussing the potential impact of Waffle House on agreements to
arbitrate and settlement agreements).
145. See Chad Egan Burton, EEOC v. Waffle House: Employers Win, Again, 71 DEF.
COUNS. J. 52 (2004) (asserting that Waffle House is a "hollow" victory because the EEOC files
only a small percentage of cases); David H. Gibbs, ADR After Waffle House, Arbitration Gets
New Trilogy of Employment Law, 20 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 17 (2002) (referring
to a small number of cases that the EEOC brings in terms of assessing the impact of Waffle
House).
146. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the "Vanishing Trial": The Growth and Impact of
"Alternative Dispute Resolution, " 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843, 900 (2004) (stating that the
"American Arbitration Association (AAA) has claimed that between 1997 and 2002, the
number of employees covered by AAA employment arbitration plans grew from 3 million to 6
million").
147. There may be other reasons, besides any implications from Waffle House, that may
start to make employers consider a reduction in the use of arbitration. See infra Part III.A
(describing some complaints by employers about arbitration without mentioning anything about
the EEOC or Waffle House).
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arbitration policy is. In 2003, the EEOC began to explore the impact
of the Circuit City decision by holding meetings with several neutral
arbitration service providers to understand what procedural
requirements they had adopted in handling mandatory arbitration
claims.148
In 2004, the EEOC sent mixed signals at one point by suggesting
that it was not sure what its arbitration policy was after it supported a
settlement agreement that allowed a law firm to continue its
mandatory arbitration policy. This occurred after the implications of
the Circuit City decision were addressed by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in EEOC v. Luce, Forward,
Hamilton & Scripps.14' Although the appeals court found that the
agreement to arbitrate was valid pursuant to Circuit City, it remanded
the case to the trial court to address the EEOC's "novel" claim that
the employer retaliated by refusing to hire someone who would not
agree to arbitration as a condition of employment. A spokesperson
for the EEOC admitted in July 2004 when commenting on the
eventual settlement of the Luce, Forward case that the EEOC's 1997
policy was "still technically in effect" but there was "a lot of
confusion" at the EEOC about how to apply its arbitration policy.'
Cliff Palefsky, the attorney representing the plaintiff in the
settled Luce, Forward case asserted that the EEOC's decision to drop
the case instead of pursuing its "novel" retaliation claim was a
"political one.""' As further support that any action by the EEOC
regarding mandatory arbitration in the Luce, Forward case would
have political implications, Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy had
sent the EEOC Chair a letter signed by six other Democrats asking
the EEOC to not drop the case after it had been remanded. 52 Some of
the political heat on the EEOC was ameliorated by the fact that the
ultimate resolution in the Luce, Forward case was not presented
directly to the Commission for a vote as the EEOC's General
Counsel acted independently in making the decision to settle. 5 '
Regarding arbitration, the only position that the EEOC seems
willing to push is its right, under Waffle House, to still file a suit
148. See EEOC Considers Policy Change, DiSP. RESOL. J., Aug./Oct. 2003, at 6.
149. 345 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
150. See Nancy Montwieler, EEOC Accord Puts Its Stamp of Approval On Law Firm's
Mandatory Arbitration Plan, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 132, at AA-1 (July 12, 2004).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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despite the existence of an arbitration agreement. 15 4 Accordingly, the
broader potential impact of Waffle House was completely dropped,
and the EEOC's 2004 actions suggested, without clearly stating so,
that it was now creating a policy of endorsing employer-mandated
arbitration. Thereby, it abdicated any responsibility for declaring a
clear policy on the state of mandatory arbitration as of 2004.
Essentially, its inaction and mixed messages have created an
unwritten policy that merely said it will leave it up to the courts. Such
inaction, regardless of the reasons,"' represented a major failure of
the EEOC when it seemed to be at a juncture after Waffle House,
where it had a significant opportunity to guide employees and
employers regarding the current issues of the day concerning
employer-mandated arbitration.
Nevertheless, some key questions remain. The EEOC still has a
chance to state an official policy regarding these matters. One could
try to determine if there is a coherent approach from some of the
cases filed by the EEOC and some of its amicus briefs. But that
analysis does not offer the powerful guidance that employers and
employees received from the EEOC when it first issued the 1997
policy statement.
In December 2003, a representative from an employer group
asked the EEOC to reconsider its general opposition to mandatory
arbitration and develop "a more moderate approach."' Although the
EEOC has not responded, the EEOC can still in 2007 make its mark
154. See generally David L. Hudson, Don't Stop Probes of Worker Complaints, EEOC Says,
Two Courts Rule Arbitration Pact Can't Block Agencies' Investigations, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT
(Jan. 30, 2004). The EEOC has also thought enough about other areas related to its
enforcement policies to come out with new guidance in those areas. See Hope Yen, Workplace
Guidelines on Bias Updated, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 20, 2006, at D3 (discussing new guidelines issued
by the EEOC "aimed at combating subtle forms of race discrimination, a persistent problem" in
the workplace). Also, the EEOC has been at the forefront of a novel issue over the last few
years through its suit against the law firm, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, C.A., No. 05 C 0208
filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on January 13, 2005.
See Martha Neil, Suing Sidley Austin, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2007, at 33. In that case, the EEOC has
"embolden[ed] law firm partners to explore severance options" by filing a "groundbreaking
discrimination suit . .. against Sidley Austin a major Chicago-based law partnership" that asserts
partners can be employees covered by anti-discrimination laws. Id.
155. See infra Part IV.
156. See Ann Elizabeth Reesman, General Counsel, Equal Employment Advisory Council,
Remarks at EEOC Meeting on EEOC Mediation Program and the Workplace Benefits of
Mediation (Dec. 2, 2003), <http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/meetings/12-2-03/reesman.html>
(last visited Mar. 15, 2007) (referring to comments of Ann Reesman on behalf of an
organization called Employers Employment Advisory Committee applauding the EEOC for
expanding its mediation program but suggesting that "the lesson of Gilmer, Circuit City and
their progeny is that if there is a way to enforce the agreement, the court (or, in this case, the
Commission) should do so, resolving doubts in favor of arbitration").
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by updating its policy. As part of that process, it should also consider
the perspectives of employers and employees about what works and
does not work. There should be enough information about these
perspectives given the number of years and the abundance of
statutory employment discrimination disputes that have now been
resolved through arbitration. Finally, this policy should also address
the key legal questions that still remain unanswered.
A. Perspectives of Employers
As a whole, the general belief is that employers find mandatory
arbitration to be an advantage because of savings in time, costs, and
privacy."' Also, the fact that mandatory arbitration prevents
employers from having to be exposed to large and unpredictable jury
verdicts represents a significant advantage for them."'8 And by having
to resolve the matter in arbitration, it can foster earlier settlement
without subjecting the employer to consideration of the nuisance
value as the prospect of going to arbitration becomes the endpoint of
the negotiations."9
On the other hand, employers have already started to identify
disadvantages when the time and cost savings do not register and
employers find themselves tied up in costly and lengthy arbitration. 6"
Although parties may debate about who is harmed most, the lack of
formal discovery and rules of evidence can concern employers and
especially their counsel who have unique expertise in how to win
employment discrimination claims. 6 ' Attorneys for employers use the
rules of discovery and rules of evidence to their tactical advantage.
Last minute surprises with witnesses testifying on crucial matters
without the employer having any idea about what that person might
testify to and the inability to use the rules of procedure and evidence
to limit and control the information presented represents a key
157. See Green, Myth of Employer Advantage, supra note 71, at 421-24 (discussing these
purported benefits as reasons why employers adopt the programs but challenging whether there
is much proof that supports these benefits); see also Leslie A. Gordon, Clause for Alarm, As
Arbitration Costs Rise, In-House Counsel Turn to Mediation or a Combined Approach, A.B.A.
J., Nov. 2006, at 19, 19 (stating that arbitration is "[t]raditionally praised for its flexibility,
informality, confidentiality and ability to produce unique awards not available in traditional
litigation").
158. Green, Myth of Employer Advantage, supra note 71, at 454-59.
159. Id. at 422 & n.81.
160. Id. at 422-24 (describing "nightmarish experiences"); see also Gordon, supra note 157,
at 19.
161. Id. at 438-40 (highlighting difficulties for employers due to lack of discovery).
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disadvantage.162
Continued use of mandatory arbitration agreements also may
cause morale problems possibly fostering union movements.'63 The
limited review of arbitration decisions has rankled some employers
when they discover arbitrators have made some fundamental errors.
Employers have also still found themselves in courts either fighting
the fairness of the arbitration agreement as a whole or they have been
brought in through a lawsuit filed by the EEOC.
A recent study suggests that corporations do not value
arbitration when dealing with each other as much as they do when
dealing with individuals.6" Although the "[c]ourts do in fact, enforce
arbitration clauses" as corporate counsel "gain more experience in
how mandatory clauses play out" they learn more about the pros and
cons of using arbitration. 65  From that experience, some recent
complaints by employers have suggested that they have become less
inclined to use arbitration. 16 6 Within those recent complaints, some of
the general disadvantages have become more prominent including:
unpredictability of the arbitrator's ruling; convoluted enforcement;
increasing costs and delays; lack of discovery; lack of summary
judgment; lack of meaningful judicial review; and an increasing
preference for mediation as a tool to resolve these disputes.'67
B. Perspectives of Employees
While employers certainly have advantages and disadvantages in
162. Id. at 439 (referring to expertise of employer's counsel and issues from a "Perry
Mason" surprise at arbitration).
163. See Michael Z. Green, Opposing Excessive Use of Employer Bargaining Power in
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Through Collective Employee Actions, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN
L. REv. 77, 98-104 (2003) (discussing incentives that unions have to organize around message to
employees centered on mandatory arbitration clauses).
164. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight From Arbitration: An Empirical
Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL
L. REv. 335 (2007).
165. Gordon, supra note 157, at 19.
166. Id. at 19; see also Mary S. Diemer, Profession Looks for Alternatives to Arbitration,
Judicial Reference and Collaborative Law Gain Favor, LITIG. NEWS, Nov. 2006, at 6 (asserting
that "a growing number of attorneys across the country ... believe that arbitration has become
less effective as an inexpensive means of resolving disputes" while identifying "judicial
reference and collaborative law" as "[t]wo new entries to the field of alternative dispute
resolution" that are "gaining traction with lawyers who have grown dissatisfied with more
traditional means of ... (ADR), primarily arbitration"').
167. Gordon, supra note 157, at 19-21 (describing comments of in-house counsel for two
corporations about why they have started to look down on using arbitration for their
employment disputes and have embraced mediation).
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pursing mandatory arbitration, employees have a number of the same
issues. For employees, the benefits of time, and costs translate as
equally well to them as they do for employers. Also, arbitration as an
alternative to the courts can allow for some additional voice and
procedural process that does not become available to an employee
through the courts. Most importantly, given the dismal results in the
court system and the opportunity for employees to potentially have
better results in arbitration, there are certainly reasons for employees
to not give up on this method of resolving employment discrimination
disputes."'
However, there are some disadvantages for employees as well.
Plaintiffs' employment attorneys have consistently criticized these
agreements as unfair. 169 Certainly, lack of attorney representation
creates a problem both in arbitration and in the courts.o The most
criticized aspect of mandatory arbitration involves the unknowing
coercion into that forum to resolve statutory discrimination claims
when an employer, the entity regulated by the statute, uses its
overwhelming bargaining power in requiring an employee to agree to
arbitration as a condition of employment.7
On the other hand, if employees agree to arbitrate after a dispute
arises, very little criticism of that form of arbitration has occurred
because such agreements tend to resemble the same process that
occurs when employees decide to settle. While arbitration may offer
many benefits for employees and employers, a focus on post-dispute
168. See Michael Z. Green, Tackling Employment Discrimination with ADR: Does
Mediation Offer a Shield for the Haves or Real Opportunity for the Have-Nots?, 26 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 321, 327-30 (2005) [hereinafter Green, Tackling Employment Discrimination]
(suggesting benefits for employees in pursuing arbitration given the harsh results presented by
the court system).
169. See Cliff Palefsky, Only a Start: ADR Provider Ethics Principles Don't Go Far Enough,
DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2001, at 18, 20-23 (describing criticism of mandatory arbitration
agreements by plaintiff's attorney who has consistently criticized the enforcement of such
agreements and now challenges the inability of the parties and the free market system to
regulate arbitrators' neutrality and ethics given that employers who are satisfied with
arbitrators' performance will want to select those arbitrators repeatedly and thereby give them a
large volume of business to the arbitrators); Richard C. Reuben, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses
Under Fire, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 58, 58-60 (asserting challenges by the National Employment
Lawyers Association (NELA) and threatened boycott of arbitration service providers).
170. See Michael Z. Green, Finding Lawyers for Employees in Discrimination Disputes as a
Critical Prescription for Unions to Embrace Racial Justice, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 55, 64-66,
72-77 (2004) [hereinafter Green, Finding Lawyers] (describing difficulties for employees in
obtaining legal counsel for employment disputes in court while also describing the same
difficulties in alternatives to the court including mediation and arbitration).
171. Green, Tackling Employment Discrimination, supra note 168, at 330 & n.37 (citing
articles advancing this criticism).
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rather than predispute agreements to arbitrate might change the
parameters of arbitration.1 72  However, some question whether
employers and employees would have the same incentives to agree to
arbitrate after a dispute has arisen and believe that most employment
disputes would not become the subject of a post-dispute agreement to
arbitrate.17 1 If post-dispute agreements to arbitrate could occur,
employees should be able to reap most of the rewards from
arbitration that the courts do not offer and could do so with little
criticism about enforcing the agreement to arbitrate.
Furthermore, additional complaints assert that mandatory
arbitration does not provide the formality and opportunity for formal
discovery and rules that employees benefit from in the courts when
they want to gather information from the employer to help process
their claims. 174 Also, on a broader perspective, lack of a public
vindication and precedent hinders growth in the law and prevents
employees from knowing about the opportunities for enforcement
under employment discrimination law.'7
Employers usually maintain such a repeat player advantage, at
least through their lawyers, which may present employees with a
disadvantage given the overall expertise of employers' counsel in
resolving employment disputes on a repeated basis."' And that repeat
172. See generally Michael Z. Green, Measures to Encourage and Reward Post-Dispute
Agreements to Arbitrate Employment Discrimination Claims, 8 Nev. L.J. _ (forthcoming
2007).
173. See Scott Baker, A Risk-Based Approach to Mandatory Arbitration, 83 OR. L. REV. 861
(2004) (post-dispute agreements do not raise the same incentive concerns for employers as
predispute agreements and "are different in kind"); Matthew Bodie, Questions About the
Efficiency of Employment Arbitration Agreements, 39 GA. L. REV. 1 (2004) (post-dispute
agreements to arbitrate provide a more efficient result for employees but employers can see a
benefit to predispute agreements because it make it difficult and inefficient for employees
through those agreements); Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate
Over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559
(2001) [hereinafter Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws] (finding post-dispute agreements to be an
"illusory" alternative); Lewis Maltby, Out of the Frying Pan, Into the Fire: The Feasibility of
Post-Dispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 313 (2003)
(enforcing post-dispute agreements to arbitrate will not work well in practice); David Sherwyn,
Because It Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary Arbitration Programs Will Fail to Fix the
Problems Associated with Employment Discrimination Law Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 1 (2003) (post-dispute agreements to arbitrate are unwise and not likely to occur).
174. Green, Myth of Employer Advantage, supra note 71, at 438 n.141; see also EEOC
POLICY, supra note 62 (asserting that one of the reasons why the EEOC believes mandatory
arbitration should not be enforced is because "[d]iscovery is significantly limited compared with
that available in court and permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure").
175. EEOC POLICY, supra note 62 ("because decisions are private, there is little, if any,
public accountability even for employers who have been determined to violate the law").
176. See Green, Tackling Employment Discrimination, supra note 168, at 339-41 & nn.70-80
(describing the depths of the repeat player lawyer advantage for employers).
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player lawyer advantage for employers becomes exacerbated in the
court system and probably explains, in part, the dismal results for
employees in the courts." Accordingly, the repeat player lawyer
advantage does not offer a worse scenario for employees in
arbitration. There might also be a way to address the issue in
arbitration so that it ends up becoming an advantage for employees
compared to the courts because some employers offer legal service
plan benefits for their employees as part of their agreements to
arbitrate.1 7 ' However, the fact that the arbitrator may be called upon
for future work represents a repeat player concern about the
arbitrator as only the employer as a repeat player will have this
potentially conscious or unconscious influence (of potential future
selection and continued business opportunities) on the arbitrator.'
Finally, in terms of the selection of the decision maker, the arbitrator,
the employee does not have the constitutional protections that rest in
the courts to make sure that the decision maker comes from a fair
cross section of the population rather than from a racially or gender
stratified pool.o80
177. Id. at 327 n.24 (citing the following as evidence of the poor results for employees in the
court system: Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 547 (2003); Kevin M. Clermont &
Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ From
Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947; Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab,
How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
429, 451-52 (2004) (describing "a troublesome anti-plaintiff effect in federal appellate courts" for
employment discrimination claimants along with a bias against plaintiffs at the trial level)
(emphasis in original); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Double Standard on Appeal:
An Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals 1, 1
(July 16, 2001) (describing an empirical study conducted at the request of two plaintiffs'
employment discrimination firms and finding that "[e]mployment discrimination plaintiffs are
far more likely than defendants to be reversed on appeal" because "only 5.8 percent [of
defendants"] judgments are reversed; when "43.61 percent of [plaintffs'] judgments are
reversed"), available at <http://www.findjustice.comlfiles/Eisenberg&-Schwab-Report.pdf>
(last visited July 2, 2007); see also Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So
Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 560-61 (2001) (asserting that employers prevail in 98 percent
of federal court employment discrimination cases resolved at the pretrial stage).
178. See generally Michael Z. Green, Ethical Incentives for Employers in Adopting Legal
Service Plans to Handle Employment Disputes, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 395 (2006).
179. Bales, Normative Consideration, supra note 60, at 384 (describing subconscious repeat
player arbitration concern); Palefsky, supra note 170 (asserting similar concern about arbitrator
repeat player influence).
180. See generally Sarah Rudolph Cole & E. Gary Spitko, Arbitration and the Batson
Principle, 38 GA. L. REV. 1145 (2004); William B. Gould, IV, Kissing Cousins: The Federal
Arbitration Act and Modern Labor Arbitration, 55 EMORY L.J. 609 (2006); Michael Z. Green,
An Essay Challenging the Racially Biased Selection of Arbitrators for Employment
Discrimination Suits, 4 J. AM. ARB. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Green, Racially Biased Selection]; E.
Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator Majoritarian
Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275, 312
(1999).
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Actual feelings of employees about their experiences in
arbitration represents another area that is ripe for more analysis. One
study analyzed the viewpoints of employees who had participated in
arbitration under mandatory arbitration agreements at two
companies, Travelers Corporation (now Citigroup) and Cigna
Corporation.'"' This study focused on the employees' perceptions of
fairness and the effectiveness of the process in resolving their claims.
A questionnaire was mailed to all employees who had filed a
complaint under the Travelers and Cigna dispute resolution programs
over a two-year period.'" They received a 31 percent response or a
total of thirty-eight actual responses from Cigna complainants and a
39 percent response or a total of forty-three actual responses from
Travelers complainants.'83 The results indicated that for "both
programs, the number of persons who proceeded to arbitration was
less than 5 percent of all complainants."" The researchers conducting
the study concluded that the complainants did not consider the
procedures as fair or effective unless they obtained the result that
they had been seeking.' They also concluded that if there were fair
procedures offered to employees and the employees' overall concerns
about procedural due process were satisfied, then the employees were
more willing to recommend the arbitration program to other
employees.'8 6 Although there was some perception of fairness in
having their day before the arbitrator, the most significant factor
derived from the research was the finding that satisfaction with
mandatory arbitration primarily ended up being outcome
determinative.
Another study has recently asserted that although employees
fare better in arbitration than in the courts, the "victories are
considerably discounted in value."'"Any ongoing analysis about the
impact of employment arbitration on employees still requires more
181. See E. Patrick McDermott & Ruth Obar, Workplace Dispute Resolution After Circuit
City: A Complainant's Perspective on Employer Dispute Resolution Programs Requiring
Mandatory Arbitration, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 1157 (2002).
182. Id. at. 1169.
183. Id. at 1169 nn.73-74.
184. Id. at 1174.
185. Id. at 1187.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1189.
188. See Michael H. LeRoy, Getting Nothing for Something: When Women Prevail in
Employment Arbitration Awards, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 573, 576-77 (2005) (asserting that
employees tend to win in arbitration but the value of the award is much less than what the
courts offer).
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empirical study.18 9 One of the leaders in performing empirical studies
regarding employment claims and ADR, Lisa Bingham, has recently
asserted that "[the field needs a well-designed empirical examination
of how arbitration compares to the traditional litigation process,
preferably using random assignment or matched pairs of cases"
because "[t]his is information policymakers need in order to decide
how to address competing claims about efficiency or bias in
mandatory employment arbitration. "190 Thus, even though the
consensus amongst scholars is that we need more empirical data,
there is also a concern about whether the data sets to compare
information about employment arbitration versus litigation can offer
enough to come up with any definitive conclusions about the impact
when employees resolve their claims through arbitration. 91
C. Still Pressing Legal Uncertainties
Although there are many critics of the use of employer-
mandated arbitration,192 there are many fine benefits to using
arbitration that might still warrant serious consideration. This would
require a thought process of changing arbitration as it currently exists
rather than abandoning it completely so that you do not throw out the
"bathwater with the baby" in trying to address concerns about
employer-mandated arbitration. 93 As critics of those who favor the
189. See David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path
for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (2005) (asserting the need for new directions in
the development of empirical research regarding employment arbitration); Stephen J. Ware,
The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and Other Approaches to the Study of Employment Arbitration,
16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 735, 736 (2001) (identifying problems with sparse empirical
information regarding employment arbitration and suggesting that the information that does
exist offers little help in understanding the parameters of employment arbitration analysis).
190. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Dispute Resolution: The Case for Mediation, 22
CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 145, 161 (2004) [hereinafter Bingham, Case for Mediation]. Lisa
Bingham's empirical work regarding both arbitration and mediation of employment disputes
has resulted in several key articles. Id. at 168-69 (listing many of Bingham's articles); see also
David B. Lipsky & Ariel C. Avgar, Commentary: Research on Employment Dispute Resolution:
Toward a New Paradigm, 22 CONFLICr RESOL. Q. 175, 175 (2004) (stating that Lisa Bingham's
"own research on the repeat-player effect in arbitration, the use of transformative mediation in
the U.S. Postal Service, and other topics is testimony to the important role that research can
play in an evolving field").
191. Bales, Normative Consideration, supra note 60, at 351-52 (describing difficulties in
gathering and analyzing data from those empirical studies regarding the effect of arbitration on
employees that have been conducted due to small sample sizes and high standard deviations).
192. Most of that criticism has focused on concerns about being required as a condition of
employment to arbitrate statutory claims rather than having a jury-based resolution despite
little bargaining power to negotiate for a different outcome. See Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory
Arbitration, supra note 79, at 1632-34 (describing criticisms).
193. See generally David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of
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courts versus arbitration ask about such litigation romanticism, is
arbitration so bad when compared to the courts?'94 Even some
empirical studies have suggested that arbitration may provide better
opportunities for employees when compared to the dismal results
obtained from pursuing employment discrimination claims in the
court systems."' And this is not a one-sided consideration as
arbitration can still provide certainty and some opportunities for a
fast and less expensive resolution than in the courts for employers." 6
By coming out with a clear policy, the EEOC will give employers
what they so dearly desire: some certainty about how to proceed.'
The main way to provide that certainty would be to have the EEOC
provide guidance about the pressing legal issues that still remain
regarding arbitration of employment discrimination claims.
1. Same Substantive Forum Rights: Costs and Class Actions
Despite the growth of arbitration, many concerns remain
Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out The Bath Water, And Constructing A New
Sink In The Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 99-100 (1999).
194. See Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws, supra note 173, at 563-66 (asserting that courts
don't offer a better system than arbitration for employment discrimination plaintiffs and that
empirical data suggests arbitration may outperform the courts and provide more realistic
options for low income workers); Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace
Justice, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 105, 106-107 (2003), [hereinafter Maltby, Workplace Justice] (arguing
that there are some benefits to arbitration when compared with difficulties in the court system);
Theodore J. St. Antoine, Gilmer in the Collective Bargaining Context, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 491, 499 (2001) (arguing same). Litigation romanticists tend to see the world with
litigation-colored glasses while ignoring the problems of the litigation approach. See Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Identifying Real Dichotomies Underlying the False Dichotomy: Twenty-First Century
Mediation in an Eclectic Regime, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 371, 385-86 (describing the litigation-
romanticism phenomenon). Carrie Menkel-Meadow has consistently raised concerns about the
narrow approaches of litigation romanticists. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute is it
Anyway? A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement, 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2669 (1995)
(criticizing "litigation romanticism" as involving "empirically unverified assumptions about what
courts can or will do" and "a focus almost exclusively on structural and institutional values"
while "giv[ing] short shrift to those who are actually involved in the litigation"); see also Sarah
Kristine Trenary, Rethinking Neutrality: Race and ADR, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug. 1999, at 40, 44
("many critics of ADR suffer from 'litigation romanticism"' and fail to face that many of the
problems that "they identify with ADR are also present in traditional adjudication").
195. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL'Y J. 189, 209-20 (1997); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and
Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 40 (1998); see also LeRoy, supra note 188, at
576-77 (asserting that employees tend to win in arbitration at a high percentage although men
tend to win more than women in arbitration).
196. See generally Baker, supra note 173 (asserting that mandatory arbitration gives
employers certain risk assessment benefits that are not available through other forms of dispute
resolution).
197. See Reesman, supra note 156 (asserting that employers would benefit from clar-
ification of the EEOC's policy on arbitration and asking that the EEOC identify fair
procedures).
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regarding the overall fairness of the arbitral forum when compared
with the judicial forum. A judicial doctrine has developed to insure
that statutory claims which have been moved out of the judicial forum
through an arbitration agreement must still allow the claimant to
"effectively vindicate" those claims in the arbitral forum for the
agreement to be enforced.198 One case that appeared to highlight this
concern was the 1997 decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in Cole v. Burns International Securities
Services. 99 In Cole, the court enforced an agreement to arbitrate a
Title VII discrimination claim and found that there needed to be
certain "minimum standards" for arbitrations of statutory claims
when the arbitration is a mandatory condition of employment. These
standards include: a neutral arbitrator knowledgeable in relevant law;
a fair method to obtain necessary information to establish a claim;
affordable access to the process, which may require payment by
employers of the full costs of the arbitrator's fees when use of
arbitration is imposed as a condition of employment, because having
to pay for the arbitration would deter its use and "undermine
Congress's intent" when plaintiffs do not have to pay judges in the
judicial forum; right to legal representation; right to the same
remedies as those remedies available in litigation; a written opinion
by the arbitrator explaining the reasons for the award; and the right to
sufficient judicial review to ensure compliance with governing
statutory rights.200
All of the concerns addressed in Cole still arise today whether
addressed directly from application of Cole or through the
"effectively vindicate" doctrine. Essentially, the issue arises when
employers decide to overreach and offer arbitration agreements that
prevent employees from seeking the same remedies they would have
198. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-
Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 397-98
(2006) (referring to the "effectively vindicate" doctrine as a creature of the court's application
of the FAA to allow statutory claims to be arbitrated); Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing
Adhesive Arbitration Agreements - with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and
Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 254, 269-273 (2006) (describing the "effectively vindicate"
doctrine along with its origins and applications).
199. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
200. Id. at 1482-83, 85 & n.11 (describing procedures). Other cases have followed Cole by
requiring some of the minimum standards of fairness identified therein. See, e.g., Ramirez-de-
Arellano v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 133 F.3d 89, 91 (1st Cir. 1997) (requiring notice, discovery,
unbiased arbitrators, and meaningful review for wage and hour claims); Patterson v. Tenet
Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1997) (requiring "neutral arbitrators, adequate
discovery" for Title VII claims).
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in the courts or place additional burdens on them in arbitration that
would not be heaped upon them in the courts.201 Examples include
attempting to bar attorney's fees202 and limiting access to punitive
damages,203 though some concerns have become more prevalent than
others.
For example, the question of who should pay for the costs of
arbitration including arbitrator fees has reached a pervasive level.
This issue might have been resolved by the Supreme Court in 2000,
but instead, it created an analytical construct that has led to
uncertainty and case-by-case analysis. In Green Tree Financial Corp -
Alabama v. Randolph, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether "a party [can] invalidate an arbitration agreement on the
ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive." 20 4 The
Court held that the party who wants to invalidate the arbitration
agreement must prove the likelihood that the costs would be
prohibitively expensive. 2 05 However, the Court did not make clear
how the proponent might prove this. Although the case involved a
consumer finance arbitration, rather than employment, the holding of
the court has had significance in employment discrimination
arbitration, too.206
201. See generally David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses:
Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49 (2003) (identifying such
agreements and arguing for measures that will prevent them from being enforced).
202. See, e.g., McCaskill v. SCI Mgmt. Corp., 298 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding
arbitration agreement unenforceable that barred the employee's ability to recover attorney's
fees).
203. See, e.g., Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, 262 F.3d 677 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding that
provision limiting punitive damages should be severed from arbitration agreement).
204. 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000).
205. Id.
206. See Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 512 (6th Cir. 2004) (where the EEOC
argued in an amicus brief and the court agreed that a "cost-splitting" provision in an arbitration
agreement must invalidate the entire agreement to arbitrate or else it would not deter an
employer from pursuing such clauses if it knew the worst penalty would merely be a severance
and continuation of the arbitration); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 662 (6th
Cir. 2003) (asserting that the mere possibility that an employee may be subjected to substantial
costs will deter many employees from pursuing claims and should not be enforced); Shankle v.
B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234-36 (10th Cir. 1999) (denying enforcement
of an arbitration agreement of an employment discrimination matter because it imposed a fee
some where between $1875 and $5000 on an employee who was a janitor). A number of
commentators have discussed the questions and scope of the concerns regarding arbitration
costs. See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrator Fees: The Dagger in the Heart of Mandatory
Arbitration For Statutory Discrimination Claims, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1 (2003);
Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 729
(2006). The problems have not been clarified by the courts which now address these problems
and burdens of costs for employment arbitration on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Musnick v.
King Motor, 325 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2003) (following case by case approach to issue and citing
cases as following same approach as to whether costs of arbitration will be prohibitive: Blair v.
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Another pressing question in terms of the "effectively vindicate"
doctrine and the Cole factors that has become the subject of much
discussion2 ( is whether class actions may be resolved through
arbitration or whether arbitration agreements essentially prohibit
class actions. Again, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to
provide some clarity on this issue in 2003 but failed to give a clear
answer by suggesting that it should be up to the arbitrator to decide
whether class actions may be viable in light of an agreement to
arbitrate. In Greentree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,208 the Supreme
Court found that the question of whether an agreement to arbitrate
encompassed the handling of class action claims in arbitration was
subject to determination by the arbitrator.2 " Similar to the Supreme
Court's handling of arbitration costs, the issue of class actions arose in
a consumer finance setting. However, that case has application to
employment discrimination arbitration, too. 2 10
Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 610 (3d Cir. 2002); Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 304
F.3d 469, 471 n.6 (5th Cir. 2002); Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc., 238 F.3d
549, 556 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Estlund, supra note 198, at 429 (criticizing the Supreme Court's
holding in Randolph that plaintiffs must prove arbitration fees and costs would be "prohibitively
expensive" by stating "the Supreme Court failed" and its decision "is a supremely unhelpful
approach to employers, employees, and lower courts evaluating the lawfulness of any particular
fee schedule"); Laurie Leader & Melissa Burger, Let's Get a Vision: Drafting Effective
Arbitration Agreements in Employment and Effecting Other Safeguards to Insure Equal Access
to Justice, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 87 (2004) (describing problems in courts' assessment of
impact from arbitration costs and fees); Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, When is Cost an
Unlawful Barrier to Alternative Dispute Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory
Employment Arbitration, 50 UCLA L. REV. 143, 177-93 (2002) (analyzing sixty-two
employment discrimination cases involving employee challenges to the enforcement of the
arbitration agreement based on cost objections).
207. See generally Kenneth R. Pierce, Down the Rabbit Hole: Who Decides What's
Arbitrable? 21 J. INT'L ARB. 289 (2004) (criticizing the Supreme Court's approach in Bazzle of
letting the arbitrator decide whether class actions are subject to being resolved pursuant to the
parties' agreement to arbitrate); Jean R. Stemlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the
Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive? 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000) [hereinafter
Sternlight, Arbitration Meets Class Action] (lamenting the potential detriment to class actions by
the continued use of mandatory arbitration agreements): Maureen A. Weston, Universes
Colliding: The Constitutional Implications of Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1711 (2006) (criticizing the increasing use of arbitration as having a detrimental impact on
constitutional due process in class actions that protect non-participating class members when
under Bazzle the arbitrator decides the propriety of class actions subject to an agreement to
arbitrate).
208. 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
209. Id. at 451-52.
210. See John B. O'Keefe, Comment, Preserving Collective-Action Rights in Employment
Arbitration, 91 VA. L. REV. 823, 824-25 (2005) (discussing the application of Bazzle in the
employment setting).
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2. Fair Procedures: Arbitrator Selection and Pool Diversity
Given that 95 percent of claimants in employment disputes are
unable to obtain legal counsel,' the selection of the decision maker
represents an essential component of justice. Others have recognized
the importance of having diverse individuals be selected as the
neutral dispute resolution professional. 212 Anecdotal information in
2004 indicated that the National Academy of Arbitrators, one of the
most experienced groups of arbitrators for handling such claims, had
"no more than 2 period" black members.213 In recent information
captured by William Gould regarding leading arbitration service
providers, JAMS and the American Arbitration Association (AAA),
he stated:
The fact is that a small percentage of arbitrators are blacks, other
minorities, or women. The same minuscule representation is
reflected in the membership rolls of the blue ribbon organization
(the National Academy of Arbitrators) and it is reflected on the
panels established by both AAA and JAMS. Of approximately 225
arbitrators on the JAMS list, 20-25 are women, 5 or 6 are black and
another 5 are Asian. There appear to be a smaller number of
Hispanics on the list. Thus, it is said that the typical arbitrator in a
JAMS individual contract case is both white and male. The AAA
has done somewhat better: Of the 664 members of [the]
employment panel nationally, 220 are women. Of that same panel
of 664, 54 have identified themselves as minority.214
In civil matters, such as employment disputes, brought in courts,
the public jury selection process comes with certain constitutional
equal protection guarantees that allow the participants to challenge
the use of stereotypes including race in selecting jurors.215 These
constitutional guarantees, called Batson challenges after the Supreme
211. Green, Finding Lawyers, supra note 170, at 64 n.24 (finding that "[o]nly about five
percent of those pursuing employment discrimination claims find attorneys to represent them in
court" and citing articles).
212. See Isabelle R. Gunning, Perceptions, Categorizations, and Impartiality: Arbitrators in
Racial Equality in Arbitration, 4 J. AM. ARB. 59, 70-77 (2005); Gould, supra note 181, at 654
("Nothing is more integral to the process than the identity of the adjudicator!").
213. Green, Racially Biased Selection, supra note 180, at 30 n.127 (citing anecdotal
information from 1995 stating less than 1 percent black membership in the national academy
and then my own survey from the list of 600 arbitrators on the national academy of arbitrators
website and my finding in 2004 of "no more than 2%").
214. Gould, supra note 180, at 658 (footnotes omitted).
215. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (finding as a matter of constitutional equal
protection requirements that prosecutors may not strike jurors from the jury pool on the basis of
race); see also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (extending Batson to prevent defense
counsel from employing the tactic of striking potential jurors on the basis of race); Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (extending Batson prohibitions to civil cases).
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Court decision that first acknowledged the need for protection of the
jury selection process against racial stereotypes, does not translate as
well to private arbitration guarantees because of clear constitutional
state actor issues that arise in the courts but do not appear in
arbitration.216 Because there are no opportunities for challenge under
current law in terms of Batson-type protections in arbitrator
selections," the EEOC should consider this concern about the need
for a fair process to select arbitrators for statutory employment
discrimination matters and provide guidance to address this lack of
Batson-type protection in any future policy statement. At a minimum,
the EEOC should assert that mandatory arbitration, as a substitute
for court, should not deny certain protections including guarantees
from Batson that employees would have if their claims were brought
in the courts. The only distinction would be the selection of
arbitrators versus jurors. Because both jurors and arbitrators act as
the ultimate decision makers in employment discrimination matters in
the respective judicial and arbitral forums, their selection processes
should be transparent and not involve the use of racial stereotypes.
3. Roles for Unions and Clear and Unmistakable Waivers
Since the failure of the Wright decision to clarify the concept of
clear and unmistakable waivers, the EEOC should address those
concerns for employees covered by arbitration clauses in a collective
bargaining agreement. Clearly, the EEOC will continue to operate
pursuant to Waffle House in its belief that no employee should be
precluded from filing a charge with the EEOC. However, the person
filing the charge may have no incentive to do so if she knows that
under Wright, she must pursue arbitration instead because her union
has effectuated a clear and unmistakable waiver of her statutory right
to file in court. Addressing concerns in this area may be a little more
difficult because the EEOC does not enforce labor relations laws
involving collective bargaining agreements. However, whether an
employee represented by a union may pursue in court a claim under
laws that the EEOC does enforce when the employee has not signed
any agreement to arbitrate but her union has entered into a collective
216. See Cole & Spitko, supra note 180 (explaining the difficulties in translating Batson to
arbitration because of the lack of governmental actors necessary to raise the constitutional
protections that Batson warrants).
217. Green, Racially Biased Selection, supra note 180, at 43-45 (yielding to the assumption
that courts will not extend Batson analysis and its protections to the selection of private
arbitrators).
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bargaining agreement with a non-discrimination clause represents an
important issue where the EEOC's voice should be heard. Due to the
broader public interest in not discouraging the filing of EEOC
charges, which was highlighted as a concern before and after the
Waffle House decision, the EEOC should identify exactly what would
be considered a clear and unmistakable waiver and try to resolve any
other uncertainties amongst the Gilmer, Wright, Alexander, and
Circuit City decisions.
4. Compelling Arbitration for Res Judicata Versus Retaliation
Although the Waffle House decision allows the EEOC to still
seek victim-specific relief despite the existence of an individual
agreement to arbitrate, several cases have now addressed the issue of
whether the employee must still pursue her claim in arbitration
before the EEOC completes its investigation or before it obtains
judicial relief. This argument, really an attempt to effectuate res
judicata, arises from language in the Waffle House decision stating
that "ordinary principles of res judicata, [and] mootness" may still
apply.218 Although one commentator has referred to this language
about res judicata from Waffle House as "dicta," the issue of whether
employers may require that employees pursue arbitration even if the
EEOC has taken the case remains an open question.
Accordingly, employers have started to develop strategies
regarding the use of the res judicata and mootness argument as a tool
to circumvent the impact of Waffle House by seeking to compel
individual employees to arbitrate before the EEOC can complete its
proceedings. Then arguably when the EEOC has completed its
proceedings through a court action, any relief for the individual
employee would be precluded as res judicata or moot.
For example, in EEOC v. Circuit City Stores,220 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed the claim by the
employer that the individual employee could still be compelled to
seek exclusive relief in arbitration by having signed an agreement to
arbitrate even if the EEOC has filed a lawsuit. The EEOC disagreed
and argued that an employee who has signed an agreement to
arbitrate only agrees to forego a judicial resolution when she initiates
218. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 298 (2002).
219. McNiel, supra note 144, at 775.
220. 285 F.3d 404 (6th Cir. 2002).
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a lawsuit or the EEOC issued her a right-to-sue letter.22 ' The Court
agreed with the EEOC and held that there was no case or controversy
regarding compelling arbitration because the EEOC had filed the
lawsuit, not the employee. 22
Other lower court cases seem to support the position that the
EEOC may pursue its action even if the employee agreed to arbitrate
and even suggest that the employee does not have to be compelled to
arbitrate once the EEOC files suit. In EEOC v. Rappaport, Hertz,
Cherson & Rosenthal, P.C., 2 ' the EEOC argued that "requiring an
employee to arbitrate after the EEOC has filed suit interferes with
the EEOC's right to enforce the law." 2 4 Likewise, in EEOC v.
Ralph's Grocery Co.,225 the employer sought to compel individual
arbitration with a former employee who had filed a charge of
discrimination and the employer requested a state court injunction to
prevent a state agency from investigating the discrimination charge.226
In Ralph's Grocery, the employer sent the former employee a letter
after she filed a charge of discrimination with a state agency and the
employer told her that she had to withdraw her charge because she
had signed an arbitration agreement.2 27 Because of that letter, the
plaintiff then filed a retaliation charge directly with the EEOC. 2 2 8 The
EEOC then sought an injunction in federal court to stop the
employer's state court injunction action and argued that if the state
agency (working in tandem with the EEOC) was enjoined from
investigating in order to allow arbitration, it would create a "chilling
effect on the many employees who have a statutory right to file a
charge with the EEOC or its sister state agencies." 229 The EEOC's
position in Ralph's Grocery was that the employer's state court
injunction action was a form of retaliation against employees for
exercising their right to file a charge. 23 0 Both the state and federal
courts relied on the Waffle House decision to assert that the
221. Id. at 407.
222. Id.
223. 273 F. Supp. 2d 260 (E.D. N.Y. 2003).
224. Id. at 263.
225. 300 F. Supp. 2d 637 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 640.
230. Hudson, supra note 154 (discussing the results in both the state court and the federal
court regarding the Ralph's Grocery action seeking an injunction of the state agency charge
investigation).
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN ACTION
agreement to arbitrate did not prohibit the employee from filing a
charge with the EEOC or the equivalent state agency.21 Those
agencies have an independent authority to pursue those charges.
Similar attempts by employers to compel the employee to
arbitrate after the EEOC brought suit have been asserted. A recent
attempt to still compel the employee to arbitrate despite the EEOC's
pending suit occurred in EEOC v. Physicians Service23 2 in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. Therein,
the employer moved to compel arbitration and stay the court
proceedings pending resolution in arbitr tion. The EEOC argued that
its court proceedings should not be stayed even if the arbitration
proceedings went forward.
The employer argued essentially that it could be a waste to
proceed with the court proceedings if the matters were resolved in
arbitration. But the EEOC, relying on Waffle House and other cases,
argued that its suit was independent of the arbitration claims because
the EEOC would be seeking vindication of the public interest.2 " The
district court found that the "Waffle House Court did not address
[the] specific question of whether an intervening plaintiff must
arbitrate his or her claims pursuant to an arbitration agreement
because the aggrieved party in Waffle House never intervened in the
EEOC's action." 234 According to the district court's analysis of Waffle
House, "the majority in Waffle House was aware of the dissent's
objection to the EEOC doing on behalf of an employee that which an
employee has agreed not to do for himself' and noted that the Waffle
House Court accepted that consequence of its ruling."235
Another particular case demonstrates the focus of the EEOC
when it comes to efforts by the employer to get the employee to go
forward with arbitration after the EEOC has decided to pursue the
case.236 In the case of EEOC v. Woodmen of the World Life Insurance
Society, brought in the United States District Court for the District of
Nebraska, the employer sought to compel arbitration with the
employee who had filed the charge even while the EEOC pursued its
231. Id.
232. 425 F. Supp. 2d 859 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
233. Id. at 860.
234. Id. at 861.
235. Id. at 862 (citing EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 298 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)).
236. See EEOC v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 330 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (D. Neb.
2004).
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case against the employer in court.237 Initially, the EEOC did not
express any opinion on the propriety of Rollins' arbitration
agreement while Rollins asserted that she could "pursue litigation
regardless of any agreement because the EEOC ... filed a lawsuit on
her behalf."2  The employee, without any help from the EEOC,
asserted that compelling her to arbitrate "would unfairly undermine
the EEOC's right to enforce the law." 2 39 The court held that the
agreement between the employee and her employer did not prevent
the EEOC from proceeding with its suit against the employer, but it
ordered Rollins to proceed with arbitration.240
Nine months after the court in Woodmen ordered the employee
to arbitrate her claims, the case came back to the United States
District Court for the District of Nebraska as the employee filed a
motion for relief from the order compelling arbitration. 2 4 ' The
employee alleged that she was "primarily concerned with the costs of
the arbitration" and contended that "her financial situation ... made
arbitration unaffordable." 24 2 This time the EEOC decided to weigh in
on the matter by asking the court to halt the arbitration because: 1)
the employee had merely intervened and had no right to
independently litigate her own claims; 2) arbitration would hinder the
EEOC's ability to litigate its own lawsuit; and 3) the EEOC's ability
to vindicate the public interest would be harmed if someone who had
intervened was forced to arbitrate.243 The court expressed its
displeasure with the EEOC by referring to the "failure of the EEOC
to address this issue when it arose in 2004" as "[i]t would have been
most helpful to the court had the EEOC submitted its argument to
the court in a timely matter." 244
This was not the end of the Woodmen case. After the plaintiff
filed for bankruptcy, the case was put on hold pending the bankruptcy
action. The bankruptcy court released the case, and the employer
237. Id. at 1051-52.
238. Id. at 1055.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1056.
241. See e.g., EEOC v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, Case No. 8:03CV165, 2005
WL 2180071 (D. Neb. Aug. 25, 2005) (finding that the employee could not afford to take on the
costs of arbitration as she had filed for bankruptcy and it would be permissible to allow her to
"piggyback the discovery and the litigation costs that will be paid by the EEOC"), rev'd and
remanded, 479 F.3d 561 (8th Cir. 2007).
242. Id. at *1.
243. Id. at *2.
244. Id.
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filed an appeal, which was decided by the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit on March 9, 2007.245 On appeal, it appears that the
EEOC did not take as strong a position against compelling the
employee to arbitrate as it had in the lower court and merely asserted
its right to be able to pursue the case even if the employee was
compelled to arbitrate. The court stated that in the appeal, "the
EEOC seeks only to ensure that its enforcement action will not be
stayed in the event we reverse the district court's judgment relieving
[the employee] of her obligation to arbitrate her claims." 246
Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that it was
speculative to not order arbitration because of the costs especially
because the employer had agreed to pay the costs. 2 4 7 Also, the Court
found that there was no reason to prevent the employee from being
compelled to arbitrate even if the EEOC had brought a lawsuit which
it is allowed to do pursuant to Waffle House.248
There are still a number of outstanding legal questions
concerning arbitration including but not limited to: 1) arbitration
costs; 2) use of class actions in arbitration; 3) limits on other statutory
remedies while in arbitration that would be available in the courts; 4)
the difficulties with race and gender stratified pools of arbitrators; 5)
the uncertain legalities about clear and unmistakable waivers in the
union setting; and 6) attempts to compel arbitration even in the midst
of EEOC action involved with a case to achieve res judicata. The
EEOC should clarify its position regarding these issues. Even the
EEOC's court actions with respect to challenging attempts to compel
arbitration while EEOC proceedings are pending requires more
clarification about the EEOC's current position on that matter after
the Woodmen case and the scope of its novel retaliation claims in
response to such activity.
D. Final Step: EEOC Policy on Arbitration as a New Due Process
Protocol
As mentioned, many issues still remain regarding employer-
mandated arbitration. Although the EEOC has not made any clear
statement about costs of arbitrators or prevention of remedies like
245. See Woodmen, 479 F.3d at 561.
246. Id. at 568.
247. Id. at 566-67 (finding that Woodmen had "agreed to waive the fee-splitting provision
and pay the arbitrator's fees in full").
248. Id. at 568.
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punitive damages that would be allowed in the courts, it does appear
that it will protect its right to pursue claims under Waffle House.
However, the EEOC will take aggressive efforts to prevent an
employer from trying to stop the EEOC's investigation and court
proceedings while trying to get res judicata results through compelling
arbitration of the individual employee's claims, and the EEOC may
pursue injunctive relief and retaliation claims against an employer in
its efforts to do so.
The Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of
Statutory Employment Disputes (Protocol)24 9 has provided the only
real guidance to prevent employer overreaching and to suggest some
framework for neutral arbitration service providers to deal with
statutory fairness issues in arbitration, and it has not been addressed
since 1995. There are too nhany unanswered issues and conflicting
positions for employers and employees to feel any certainty about
pursuing arbitration. And the prospects from mediation may
overwhelm any ongoing growth of arbitration.
The Protocol "once served" its purpose by establishing a set of
fair rules for dealing with stattory employment discrimination claims
in arbitration, "but the Protocol is outdated" with "courts now
increasingly fac[ing] issues not contemplated by the Protocol's
drafters [more than] ten years ago."250 As Cynthia Estlund has
recently explained:
[I]t should be possible to devise a set of rules that makes the
enforceability of a particular agreement quite predictable ex ante.
In the relatively short period since Gilmer, the law has not yet
generated those settled rules. But there is more reason to hope that
this will happen in the case of arbitration agreements. .. .251
Now is the time for the EEOC to analyze all the pending legal
issues that may affect employees' rights to vindicate their statutory
employment discrimination claims through the arbitration process.252
After completing that analysis and obtaining input from all the key
stakeholders, the EEOC should draft a new arbitration policy that
becomes the equivalent of a modern day Protocol for parties seeking
249. See Bales, Normative Consideration, supra note 60, at 341-42 (discussing the Protocol);
Bales, Protocol at Ten, supra note 69, at 174-84 (same); Green, supra note 69, at 211-21;
Harding, supra note 69, at 369-70.
250. Bales, Normative Consideration, supra note 60, at 390.
251. Estlund, supra note 139, at 426.
252. See Hart, supra note 111, at 1950 (describing how "EEOC statements do reflect
considered judgment, informed by expert analysis and research, about application of open-
ended or unclear statutory commands").
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to use arbitration in resolving an employment discrimination
dispute.253 This policy could recognize the limits of Gilmer and Circuit
City while addressing many of the concerns that the lower courts are
dealing with while emphasizing how the EEOC feels those matters
should be addressed.
IV. FEAR, POLITICS AND MEDIATION: POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS
FOR THE EEOC FAILING TO ADDRESS ITS ARBITRATION POLICY
Of course, key administrative officials may find it exasperating
for an academic to suggest that all the EEOC need do is update its
arbitration policy, given the complexity of the issues. Furthermore, it
is worth acknowledging that there may be some legitimate obstacles
that have prevented the EEOC from acting. However, it has now
become crucial for the EEOC to pick up the mantle regarding
defining arbitration policy. Some of the limitations that may have
been more problematic a few years ago should no longer be a
hindrance.
A. Fear of Blanket Rejection By the Supreme Court After Circuit City
Clearly, there have been some hindrances to the EEOC in setting
policy on arbitration. The 2001 Circuit City decision conflicted with
the 1997 policy statement's position against mandatory arbitration as
a whole. And once the EEOC realized that it had lost that fight, it
had to seriously consider not wasting its resources on losing another
uphill battle. 254 The Supreme Court has seriously relied upon the
EEOC's guidance in some instances while completely rejecting its
view in others.255 Some have questioned whether the EEOC's Policy
Statement would have any impact on the courts.256 However, the
253. Primm, supra note 62 (disagreeing with the EEOC's 1997 policy and suggesting that
mandatory arbitration may work with certain procedural safeguards already in place under the
Due Process Protocol adopted by most ADR providers); see also Bales, Normative
Consideration, supra note 60, at 391 (suggesting the need for a "successor" to the Protocol even
though the Protocol did not have the force of positive law because "courts and conscientious
employers relied on it for guidance on what was fair and what was not").
254. See Theodore W. Wern, Note, Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretation of the Civil
Rights Act, the ADA, and the ADEA: Is the EEOC a Second-Class Agency?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J.
1533, 1578-80 (1999) (suggesting that part of the EEOC's diminished impact results because
their past failures "cast a shadow over [future] EEOC guidance" and due to those "failures of
the agency in the past, courts may attach a mild presumption of invalidity to EEOC guidance").
255. Hart, supra note 111, at 1941-49.
256. Bales, Compulsory Arbitration, supra note 104, at 50 (finding it "unlikely that the
courts will adopt the EEOC's position that employment arbitration agreements are
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question for the EEOC may not necessarily be whether its clarified
position will ultimately prevail in the courts. Although court approval
should be part of the equation.
Some high profile cases have arisen in which the Supreme Court
has rejected the EEOC's policies. 257 In other cases, EEOC policy has
been very helpful to the courts in addressing many unanswered legal
questions regarding employment discrimination matters including
some landmark issues regarding acceptance of the disparate impact
theory of discrimination 25 8 and defining sexual harassment as an
actionable claim under Title VII.25 9 Also, in some instances when the
Supreme Court has blatantly rejected the position of the EEOC, the
outcry has resulted in Congress amending the statute to reverse the
Supreme Court.2 60
Besides, there is a tension that exists between the Court and the
EEOC especially when the EEOC has interpreted laws in a way that
seems favorable to employees. 261 At its root, this tension rests on
political values associated with the legislature that first created the
EEOC and changing views on the Supreme Court and Congress
about the role of the EEOC.262 Accordingly, the EEOC should not
fear court rejection of its policy especially when potential rejection
may have political overtones beyond the purview of the EEOC's
unenforceable" because courts have already agreed that they are enforceable and the "EEOC
lacks authority to interpret the FAA").
257. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999) (rejecting the
EEOC's interpretation regarding the definition of a disability under the ADA to be determined
before applying mitigating measures); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256-58
(1991) (rejecting the EEOC's interpretation regarding the application of Title VII law to
citizens of the United States while they are employed in foreign countries); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143-46 (1976) (rejecting the EEOC's interpretation of the meaning of sex
under Title VII to include pregnancy).
258. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (referring to EEOC policy and
interpretation regarding disparate impact theory in validating that theory as a possible way to
bring a Title VII employment discrimination claim).
259. Meritor Say. Bank.v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (referring to EEOC policy and
interpretation regarding the definition of harassment as supportive of the finding that
harassment, while not explicitly stated in the statute, could be a form of discrimination on the
basis of sex).
260. See Hart, supra note 111, at 1950 n.82. For example, Congress rejected the Supreme
Court's interpretation in Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143-46 (1976) by amending
Title VII to include pregnancy within the definition of sex pursuant to the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act in 1978. Id. Similarly, Congress rejected the Supreme Court's interpretation
in EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256-58 (1991) by amending Title VII to extend
extraterritorial coverage to United States citizens working overseas pursuant to Section 109 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Id.
261. Id. at 1959.
262. Id. at 1959-61.
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consideration. Furthermore, the EEOC has a mandate to eradicate
workplace discrimination and must continue its best efforts in
pursuing that mandate. In any respect, even if the Supreme Court
explicitly rejects the EEOC's opinion, the EEOC can rescind or
clarify its policy accordingly. Instead, by not addressing its policy after
landmark Supreme Court rulings including the 2001 decision in
Circuit City and the 2002 decision in Waffle House, it has been left up
to the parties to develop haphazard approaches to any remaining
issues about mandatory arbitration through the courts, a process
contrary to the whole purpose of agreeing to arbitration in the first
instance.263
B. Political Winds Within and Outside the EEOC
During most of the time since 1991 when the growth of
mandatory arbitration began, Congress was constantly being
positioned to take a strong stance about the ability to enforce
arbitration agreements against individual employees and consumers.
Despite the important efforts of United States Senator Russell
Feingold,26 and others,265  no legislation addressing mandatory
arbitration has made it through the hallowed halls of Congress for
signature by the President to date. Although recent congressional
elections may bode well for some change,26 6 the obvious political
difficulties that were preventing Congress from taking action about
arbitration must have impacted the EEOC's inability to address the
matter.
263. Gordon, supra note 157, at 20-21 (noting comments of in-house counsel complaining
that even though arbitration is used to stay out of the courts, you can't help but find yourself in
court trying to enforce the agreement when it is challenged).
264. See Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process Is Due?, 39 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 281, 284, 298 (2002) (describing several attempts by Democratic, U.S. Senator Russell
Feingold to offer legislation in Congress that would address the use of arbitration in statutory
disputes including Title VII which have also failed over the last ten years); R. Larson Frisby,
Congress Considers Curbs on Mandatory Arbitration of Consumer and Employment Disputes,
DisP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2002, at 31 (describing Senate consideration of legislation introduced
by Senator Feingold to prevent enforcement of mandatory arbitration agreements).
265. Public Citizen, a consumer advocacy group, has long challenged the use of mandated
arbitration in the employment and consumer setting. See Samuel Estreicher & Matt Ballard,
Affordable Justice Through Arbitration: A Critique of Public Citizen's Jeremaiad on the Costs of
Arbitration, DIsP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2002-Jan. 2003, at 8, 10-11 (discussing the Public Citizen
opposition to the use of arbitration and disagreeing with the position of Public Citizen).
266. See Johanna Neuman, Democrats Capture Control of Senate, Allen Concedes in Tight
Virginia Race, COURIER J., at A3 (Nov. 10, 2006) (describing results from November 2006
elections in which the Democratic party captured control of the House of Representatives and
the Senate for the first time since 1994 and how Senate Democratic leader, Harry Reid of
Nevada, asserted "[t]he days of the do-nothing Congress are over").
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Members of Congress have had no qualms about using
congressional approval of the budget to fund the EEOC as a tool to
limit the EEOC from pursuing any perceived policy focus that does
not jibe with the party controlling the purse strings.267 For example, in
1998, GOP members of Congress apparently attempted to link
funding increases for the EEOC to an agreement that would force the
EEOC to stop pursuing one of its key enforcement tools, employing
individuals as testers to examine the fairness of certain companies'
hiring processes. 268 Thus, the shadow of congressional oversight and
potential recoil at any policy changes regarding arbitration would
seem to have impacted the EEOC's decision of whether to clarify its
arbitration policy at least by the time of the Waffle House decision in
January 2002.
Also, the political make-up within the EEOC changed shortly
around the time of the 2001 Circuit City decision and clearly after
President George W. Bush was elected in 2000. Before then, the
Commission was primarily "a Democratic-led Commission ...
dependent on funding from a Republican Congress." 26 9 The
Democratic Chair of the EEOC, Ida Castro, left the Commission in
August 2001, "two years before the expiration of her five-year
term." 27 0 President Bush nominated a majority of Republican
Commissioners along with the new Republican Chair, Cari
Dominguez, who was unanimously confirmed in July 2001, and took
over after successive reigns by Democratic-appointed Chairs, Gilbert
Casellas, and Dominguez's immediate predecessor, Castro.27' Due to
political wrangling, the Bush appointments of Republican then Vice-
Chair, Naomi Earp, and Republican Commissioner, Leslie Silverman,
were not effectuated with a full Commission until late in 2003.272 But
267. See Michael Z. Green, Proposing a New Paradigm for EEOC Enforcement After 35
Years: Outsourcing Charge Processing by Mandatory Mediation, 105 DICK. L. REV. 305, 314 n.18
(2001) (citing Deborah Billings, Congressional Appropriators Move To Bar EEOC Pursuit of
Employment Tester Program, 131 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-7 (July 9,1998) (describing efforts
by GOP appropriators to link any overall increase in funding for the EEOC to an order or
agreement "not to pursue any policy which would use testers as a standard practice")).
268. Id.
269. See Nancy Montwieler, Commission's Future Remains Unclear With Three Democrats
at Leadership Helm, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at C-1 (Jan. 12, 2001) (describing how the
Commission with only three members, all Democrats, would function with incoming President
Bush being ready to appoint a new Chair and how the EEOC while Democratic-led over the
last five to six years had worked well with the Republican-led Congress).
270. See Nancy Montwieler, Ex-EEOC Chairwoman Expresses Concern Over Agency
Direction in Bush Administration, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 163. at B-1 (Aug. 23, 2001).
271. Id.
272. Vice-Chair Earp is Confirmed by Senate, Bringing EEOC to Full, Five-Member
DISPUTE RESOLUTION INACTION
when Democratic Commissioner, Stuart Ishimaru, was confirmed and
sworn in on November 17, 2003, the Commission had its full five seats
filled for the first time in seven years.273
In December 2003, then-Chair Dominguez noted that she was
"delighted to now have a full compliment of Commissioners ... [for]
the first time in seven years." 2 74 Ironically, these comments were made
at a meeting held to discuss the benefits of another form of ADR,
mediation, not arbitration.2 75  At that meeting, however,
representatives from employers' groups both made statements about
arbitration. First, Ann Reesman, General Counsel of the Equal
Employment Advisory Council, whose "membership comprises a
broad segment of the business community," while praising mediation,
asked the EEOC to remove its opposition to mandatory arbitration
because there are some instances where it is fair.276 Specifically,
Reesman stated with respect to mandatory arbitration:
While the EEOC has been consistent in its support of voluntary
mediation and other forms of ADR, it has opposed the use of
mandatory arbitration to resolve employment disputes, even
though the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as every federal appellate
court, including the Ninth Circuit, now has endorsed the legality of
mandatory agreements to arbitrate. Given the unequivocal
uniformity in the courts on this issue, we urge the EEOC to
reconsider its anti-arbitration position in favor of a more moderate
approach. ... The lesson of Gilmer, Circuit City and their progeny
is that if there is a way to enforce the agreement, the court (or, in
this case, the Commission) should do so, resolving doubts in favor
of arbitration. The EEOC continues to resist this principle,
however, opposing mandatory arbitration under any circumstance.
We believe that the time has come for the Commission to bring its
views of mandatory arbitration in line with those of the federal
appellate courts and rescind its 1997 policy statement opposing
mandatory arbitration. We urge that it be replaced with reasonable
"due process" guidelines that employers and charging parties would
be able to use to gauge the validity of mandatory agreements to
arbitrate on a case-by-case basis.277
Strength, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 213, at A-I (Nov. 4, 2003) (describing political difficulties
with the confirming some of the Bush appointments with a previously Democratic-controlled
Senate where nominations had been stalled for two years).
273. Ishimaru Sworn in as EEOC Commissioner, Bringing Panel to Full Five-Member
Strength, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 222, at A-9 (Nov. 18, 2003).
274. See Cari Dominguez, Chair, EEOC, Remarks in Meeting on EEOC Mediation
Program and the Workplace Benefits of Mediation (Dec. 2, 2003), available at <http://www.
eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/meetings/12-2-03/transcript.html> (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
275. Id.
276. See Reesman, supra note 156.
277. Id.
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Also, F. Peter Phillips, Vice-President of the CPR Institute for
Dispute Resolution (a nonprofit coalition of corporate law
departments, law firms, academics and agencies) spoke to the EEOC
at this December 2003 meeting regarding the benefits of mediation.
He concluded that it is a waste of time to focus on arbitration because
a "critical finding" from their study of several corporate dispute
resolution programs was that "nobody arbitrates anymore." 2 78 Similar
to Reesman, Phillips also praised the EEOC's mediation program
while suggesting that the EEOC should defer to the private sector
dispute resolution systems being used by employers and allow those
systems enough time to work. 9 Phillips also asserted:
The Commission should consider using its stature and authority to
encourage the development of such systems by private employers.
The Commission can make a signal contribution by promoting and
educating employers on the business rationale of dispute
management and avoidance, and not limiting its activities to the
management, resolution and adjudication of the individual cases
submitted to it. 2 8 0
Clearly, employer representatives see value in having the EEOC
take a more active and educational role when it comes to using
arbitration and other forms of ADR in the workplace. No political
winds seem to be currently impeding the EEOC's progress despite
the fact that Cari Dominguez resigned from her position as Chair
after five years and Vice-Chair Naomi Earp became the Chair in
August 2006.' The EEOC can still use its vast resources to clarify a
policy on arbitration by taking the advice of its stakeholders and
dealing with the current issues presented in some cohesive statement
that offers fair procedures for implementing arbitration agreements.
C. The Intoxicating Appeal of Mediation
The EEOC has enthusiastically endorsed the use of mediation to
resolve employment discrimination charges.m Mediation represents
278. See F. Peter Phillips, Vice-President of the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution,
Remarks at Meeting on EEOC Mediation Program and the Workplace Benefits of Mediation
(Dec. 2, 2003), available at, <http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/meetings/12-2-03/transcript.html>
(last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
279. See id.
280. Id.
281. See Nancy Montwieler, In Five Years Heading EEOC, Chair Dominguez Broadened
Enforcement, Outreach Programs, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 167, at B-1 (Aug. 29, 2006).
282. See Robert E. Talbot, A Practical Guide to Representing Parties in EEOC Mediations,
37 U.S.F. L. REv. 627, 628-30 (2003) (lauding the EEOC's mediation program); Julie Harders,
Too Good To Last? Budget Cuts Force the EEOC to Terminate Contract Mediators From its
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an extremely satisfactory mechanism for resolving employment
discrimination disputes according to the parties involved in charges
filed with the EEOC.283 In a 2000 report, An Evaluation of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission Mediation Programm
participants in the EEOC's mediation program expressed a high
degree of satisfaction with the process8' The report also stated that
"nine out of 10 participants (96 percent of employers and 91 percent
of charging parties) indicated that they would be willing to participate
in [the] EEOC's mediation program again ... [r]egardless of the
outcome of their mediation.", 6
The EEOC's mediation program started as a pilot program
conducted in four field offices in 1991.287 With the success of that
program, the EEOC established a taskforce to review further use of
the program.m After the positive results from the pilot program and
recommendations from the task force, the EEOC concluded that
mediation was a viable tool and decided to implement an ADR
program resulting in a fully implemented mediation program by April
New, Highly Touted Program, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2000, at 30; EEOC's Mediation Program Going
Strong Despite Budget Shortfall, Coordinators Say, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 59, at B-1 (Mar.
27, 2000); see also Matthew A. Swendiman, Note, The EEOC Mediation Program: Panacea or
Panicked Reaction?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 391 (2000) (describing benefits of the
EEOC mediation program).
283. See Arup Varma & Lamont E. Stallworth, Participants' Satisfaction With EEO
Mediation and the Issue of Legal Representation: An Empirical Inquiry, 6 EMP. RTs. & EMP.
POL'Y J. 387, 392 (2002) (highlighting the preference and satisfaction with mediation in
employment discrimination claims).
284. See McDERMOTr ET AL., supra note 36.
285. See Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Mediation Program Scores High Marks in Major
Survey of Participants (Sep. 26, 2000), available at <http://www.eeoc.gov/press/9-26-00.html>
(last visited Mar. 15, 2007); see also Vivian Berger, Employment Mediation in the Twenty-First
Century: Challenges in a Changing Environment, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 487, 512 (2003)
(finding that in employment mediation "many participants express contentment with the
process - sometimes even without obtaining money or other tangible rewards").
286. See Press Release, supra note 286.
287. EEOC, History of the EEOC Mediation Program, <http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/
history.html> (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
288. Id. The EEOC based its final decision on the recommendations of the taskforce and the
outstanding leadership from Commissioners who led the taskforce. See Press Release, EEOC,
Commission Votes to Incorporate Alternative Dispute Resolution Into Its Charge Processing
System; Defers Decisions On State and Local Agencies (Apr. 28, 1995), available at
<http://www.eeoc.gov/press/4-28-95a.html> (last visited June 10, 2007). At that time, then-
EEOC Commissioner Paul Miller stated his belief that ADR would assist in charge processing
because it would "facilitate early resolution where agreement is possible" and "it frees up our
resources for use in identifying, investigating, and litigating more complex cases of employment
discrimination." Id. Likewise, then Commissioner R. Gaull Silberman stated that she believed
by making ADR a part of the EEOC's "charge processing system," it would "better serve ...
constituents" and the EEOC's "law enforcement .. . mission." Id.
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1999.289 In evaluating its mediation program, the EEOC commissioned
several reports and analyses that culminated with three specific
studies of the excellent positive impact of the EEOC's mediation
290program.
When Cari Dominguez became the Chair of the EEOC, she
continued to expand efforts with the EEOC's mediation program.2 9 '
During her five-year tenure at the EEOC, Dominguez focused on
"expanded mediation" which "became a hallmark" of her
leadership. Upon reflection at the time of her departure, it was
evident that Dominguez had achieved many positive gains for the
EEOC by her dedication to the growth of the EEOC's mediation.293
In addition to the general publicity about the satisfaction that parties
have when participating, the mediation program contributed
significantly in helping the EEOC reduce its charge backlog for which
the EEOC has received a tremendous amount of positive publicity.294
The continued focus on mediation during Dominguez's time as Chair
and the fact that this focus was well-received is indicated by the fact
that despite being one of the few EEOC chairs who was not a lawyer,
she served as Chair longer than any other Chair besides Supreme
Court Justice Clarence Thomas.295 Obviously, the broad appeal of
mediation and the extremely satisfactory results obtained from the
mediation program created a major incentive for Dominguez and the
EEOC to stay focused on mediation during her tenure as Chair the
past five years. Although outside the scope of this Essay, the
emergence of mediation as a tool to resolve employment
discrimination disputes may not be a bad thing.296
289. EEOC, supra note 288.
290. See EEOC, Studies of the Mediation Program, <http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/mcd-
intro.html> (last visited June 10, 2007).
291. See Nancy Montwieler, With EEOC at Full Strength, Mediation, Call Center are Focus
for 2004, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at S-35 (Jan. 29, 2004).
292. Id.
293. Montwieler, supra note 281, at B-1.
294. See Nancy Montwieler, EEOC Reaps Record $415 Million in Benefits Resolutions,
Charge Filings Drop Off in 2004, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 243, at A-1 (Dec. 20, 2004)
(describing how 8000 charges were resolved through the EEOC's mediation program, which
continues to grow since the EEOC began mediating charges several years ago).
295. Id.
296. See generally Bingham, Case for Mediation, supra note 190 (asserting that mediation
provides efficiencies in resolving employment disputes that have failed to be established
regarding arbitration). As part of her conclusion, Lisa Bingham also reviewed the success of the
EEOC's mediation program which has become "institutionalized" and the EEOC's extensive
evaluations suggest that there is a 90 percent satisfaction rate. Id. at 159. I have also asserted
"that by the end of 2005, both victims of workplace discrimination and employers should move
to embrace mediation as a potential mechanism for resolving their disputes." Green, Tackling
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Accordingly, the EEOC's focus on mediation is not criticized;
only its failure to continue to stay on top of the use of arbitration at
the same time warrants criticism. By not addressing arbitration and
focusing on mediation, Dominguez and the rest of the EEOC
leadership failed. Quite possibly this failure occurred because of fears
of court rejection, the political realities, the focus on mediation, or
some combination thereof. In any respect, those matters should no
longer present a hindrance to EEOC action. The overwhelming
goodwill generated by the focus on mediation should leave some
room to develop a policy on arbitration. Any fears about rejection
from the Supreme Court regarding any statements on arbitration by
the EEOC should not be a concern especially in light of Waffle
House. Even if political realities made the EEOC more cautious
about bringing the issue of arbitration back to the forefront, those
political realities do not appear to be a deterrent at this point.
Unfortunately, concerns about arbitration shifted off the EEOC's
radar screen and employers and employees have tried to navigate the
courts for answers. The EEOC must now, under its mandate to
enforce the preeminent laws banning discrimination in the workplace,
establish a clear position regarding mandatory arbitration regardless
of what criticism may occur.
V. CONCLUSION: SYSTEM INTEGRITY AND ITS PUBLIC INTEREST
ROLE DEMANDS THE EEOC SET NEW POLICY REGARDING
ARBITRATION
Given the many events that have transpired regarding mandatory
arbitration since the EEOC's policy statement in 1997, the EEOC
needs to address arbitration in a more concerted way in 2007.
Essentially, the focus should be on the overall arbitration system's
integrity in handling statutory employment discrimination claims
subject to EEOC enforcement. Because employees lack much choice
when entering into predispute agreements to arbitrate, the EEOC
should identify fair agreements and procedures as a form of a modern
day Due Process Employment Protocol to guide employers,
employees, and service providers about what works and should not
work.
But the lack of any clear policy has led to abuses and concerns by
both employers and employees as the initial Protocol faces challenges
Employment Discrimination, supra note 168, at 325.
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that were not contemplated at the time. Neutral service providers
have been left with the task of developing rules and procedures that
might address many of the concerns and perspectives about the
process of arbitration for handling employment discrimination
matters. Nevertheless, the continued legal uncertainty has left
employers and employees with many potential concerns. Because
attempts to rectify these matters in Congress have proven
unsuccessful, the EEOC should take a clear position now. The reality
is that the agency charged with setting policy regarding employment
discrimination must act on this matter. Without any real analysis and
policy setting by the EEOC, major unanswered questions continue to
languish in unsettled waters. Employers and employees who have
little opportunity to challenge bad arbitration results because of
limited judicial review available have started to fear that arbitration
and arbitrators have no clear guidance about handling statutory
employment discrimination claims.
Furthermore, similar to the EEOC's focus on mediation,
employers have become more disenchanted with arbitration while
expanding the scope of their efforts to embrace mediation. Again, the
message being sent by the EEOC and its continued support for
mediation and its lack of a formal message regarding arbitration
should also be quite evident to employers and employees. Whether
arbitration really can be used effectively for handling employment
discrimination matters remains an important question. If the EEOC
does not try to establish a clear position regarding these difficult
questions of the day, and as long as ultimate resolution by the courts
would be a timely and costly endeavor, then arbitration may become
a dispute resolution tool that has lost its impact.
Maybe mediation really represents the panacea that some claim,
and arbitration will fade off into oblivion no matter what position the
EEOC takes. Whether the diminished use of arbitration as an
employment dispute resolution tool is a deserved fate or not, the
EEOC has abdicated its important enforcement responsibility by not
weighing in officially on the matter when it is obligated to do so as the
agency charged with eradicating workplace discrimination. Potential
victims of discrimination and employers regulated by statutes banning
discrimination expect that concerns about arbitration's overall system
integrity as a tool to resolve workplace discrimination claims would
warrant an official response by the EEOC.
Eventually, congressional amendment will likely be needed.
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Until then, the unregulated marketplace with employers and their
dominant bargaining power suggests that arbitration will diminish as a
dispute resolution tool while mediation continues to flourish. Despite
the significant role that the EEOC can play and the wonderful
opportunity that it had five years ago to take a major stance regarding
arbitration after the Waffle House decision, no action has been taken.
Clearly, the EEOC has found the wherewithal to take strong
positions regarding other matters. As an example, it recently issued
new workplace bias guidelines which were offered as a new chapter
for its compliance manual and because they would "give employers,
employees and lawyers better guidance on emerging areas of racial
bias."297
The EEOC's continued failure to set policy regarding arbitration
can have far reaching effects on overall dispute resolution of
employment discrimination claims. The EEOC stills sits at the
threshold of a key opportunity with respect to setting policy regarding
arbitration and if it is to achieve the major role that was contemplated
for it in addressing workplace discrimination in our society, it must
act soon by establishing some policy regarding the remaining legal
concerns about mandatory arbitration. If politics has played a role,
perhaps the recent political changes in Congress will allow the EEOC
to now resume its analysis of the impact of arbitration rather than
continue to let the 1997 policy statement lose its force amidst
statements of uncertainty about whether it even continues to remain a
viable statement of EEOC policy.
As the Waffle House decision passes its fifth anniversary and the
EEOC policy on enforcement of mandatory arbitration moves past a
decade of existence, the consequence of not taking a current position
may be that arbitration of statutory employment discrimination will
vanish from the dispute resolution equation. This could resemble the
same impact that many have started to lament regarding the
vanishing number of trials as a dispute resolution tool.29 8 Whether a
diminished number of arbitrations would be good for victims of
employment discrimination or not remains a question that the EEOC
297. Yen, supra note 154, at D3.
298. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004); see also Hope Viner
Samborn, The Vanishing Trial, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2002, at 25. But see John Lande, Shifting the
Focus From the Myth of "The Vanishing Trial" to Complex Conflict Management Systems, or I
Learned Almost Everything I Need to Know About Conflict Resolution From Marc Galanter, 6
CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 191 (2005) ( asserting that any claims of a vanishing trial are
a myth).
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should weigh in on before it becomes too late for its position to have
any impact. If that happens, it would represent a major failure for an
agency charged with such an important task of protecting public
interest regarding enforcement of federal statutes banning workplace
discrimination.
PLACING THE REALITY OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CASES IN A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT
Jean R. Sternlight*:
I. INTRODUCTION
I was delighted to participate in this session regarding the
resolution of individual employment discrimination disputes because
participation gave me the opportunity to blend several aspects of my
past lives. For eight years following law school graduation I worked at
a small plaintiff-side law firm in Philadelphia,2 99 specializing in
representing persons who believed they had been treated unfairly or
unjustly on the job. With respect to the vast majority of my clients, my
representation consisted of letting those clients know, during the
course of the initial interview, that I was not sure it made sense for
them to bring a lawsuit.3 O The most common reasons why I cautioned
most clients from bringing a lawsuit were (a) that their treatment,
while seemingly unfair, did not give rise to a clear legal cause of
* Michael & Sonja Saltman Professor of Law and Director of the Saltman Center for
Conflict Resolution, University of Nevada, Las Vegas Boyd School of Law.
299. The firm was Samuel & Ballard PC. I worked most closely with Alice W. Ballard, a
renowned plaintiff-side employment attorney.
300. I estimate that at most 10 percent of the clients for whom I conducted an initial
interview engaged my firm for additional services such as litigation. That percent is probably
fairly typical of plaintiff-side employment attorneys. Maltby, Workplace Justice, supra note 194,
at 115-16 (citing 1994 testimony of plaintiff-side attorney Paul Tobias to the effect that at least
95 percent of employees seeking assistance from the private bar are turned down); see also
Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws, supra note 173, at 563 ("most claims filed by employees [with
administrative agencies] do not attract the attention of private lawyers because the stakes are
too small and outcomes too uncertain to warrant the investment of lawyer time and resources.")
One reason this figure is low is because many persons who have lost their jobs cannot afford to
retain an attorney. One plaintiff-side attorney practicing in Chicago, Richard Gonzalez, explains
the fees that he charges in his web site, noting that pure contingency arrangements are rare.
Richard J. Gonzalez, A Guide to the Litigation of Employment Cases, <http://www.
kentlaw.edu/gonzalez/guide.html> (last viewed May 31, 2007). My own fees, practicing in
Philadelphia, in the early 1990s, were fairly similar. See generally Sherwyn et al., supra note 193,
at 96-98, n.108 (hypothesizing as to calculus plaintiff-side attorneys may use in deciding which
cases to take).
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action;' (b) that we likely could not gather the evidence to prove any
viable legal claims;3 02 and/or (c) that any likely monetary or non-
monetary gains from bringing a lawsuit were outweighed by likely
monetary and non-monetary losses.303
With respect to those clients whom I did represent, subsequent to
the initial interview, I can't say I used particularly creative dispute
resolution techniques. Of course, like most lawyers, I eventually
settled the vast majority of my cases.0 Some were settled relatively
early,305 and others not until after both sides had expended lots of time
and energy on the pretrial process.306 However, I participated in
301. Most employees in this country are employees "at will." At-will employees are typically
subject to dismissal for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason whatsoever, so long as the
employer's reason was not discriminatory. See generally MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL.,
EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.1 (3d ed. 2004). Of course some claims of discrimination also appear
weak, as a legal matter, on their face.
302. I would remind clients that we would largely be at the employer's mercy in terms of
obtaining both written and oral evidence. Discovery can be very helpful, but employers do not
necessarily turn over all documents that might be helpful to an employee who is bringing a
lawsuit. Even former (or current) friends of the plaintiff cannot be counted on for favorable
testimony if they remain employed by the company. Former employees more often provide
favorable testimony but can be impeached during cross-examination with the implication that
they bear a grudge against the employer.
303. For example I often was consulted by persons who had suffered small out-of-pocket
losses. When someone has been fired from a job that paid very little, has been fired or denied
hire from a high-paying job but already mitigated those losses, or "merely" been denied a
promotion, the monetary relief available in court hinges on emotional losses and punitive
damages. Even though plaintiffs who are successful in employment discrimination cases can
recover attorneys' fees from the employer, it is risky for attorneys to take cases on the gamble of
success and generous fee awards from courts. See generally Jean R. Sternlight The Supreme
Court's Denial of Reasonable Attorney's Fees to Prevailing Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 17 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CH. 535 (1989). On the cost side, plaintiffs must consider any fees the attorney
will charge on an ongoing basis, costs of depositions and other expenditures, non-monetary
emotional costs to the plaintiff and his/her friends and family, and reputational effects of a
lawsuit on future job searches.
304. The phenomenon of the "vanishing trial" has been widely documented. See generally
Symposium, The Vanishing Trial, 1 J. OF EMP. L. STUD. 459 (2004) (including articles by Marc
Galanter, Stephen Burbank, Shari Seidman Diamond, Theodore Eisenberg, Gillian Hadfield,
and many others). However, while it is often asserted that less than 5 percent of cases go to trial
and the rest settle, the actual numbers are different. In truth, at least in federal court, the
number of trials is much less than 5 percent. However, not all cases settle that do not go to trial.
Many are resolved on pretrial motion or through withdrawals or defaults. One study showed
that in 2002 approximately 65 percent of civil cases filed in federal court were resolved through
settlement. Gillian Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial
Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 706 (2004). Those statistics comport with my own anecdotal
experience.
305. For example, I was often retained to represent persons who had been notified they
would be laid off as part of a reduction-in-force. In many cases I could arrange a mutually
satisfactory layoff package fairly quickly.
306. For example, I obtained a settlement for one of my clients after receiving a favorable
partial summary judgment ruling stating that compulsive gambling could qualify as a disability
under Section 504 of the Rehabilitiation Act. Rezza v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 46 Fair Empl. Prac.
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almost no mediations or arbitrations in my employment cases.30' For
most of the time I was in practice, in the 1980s, it was still generally
believed that mandatory arbitration was proscribed in employment
cases.308 Nor had mediation become popular in the employment
context until after I left practice in the early 1990s.3 09 While some
companies did offer internal grievance processes, my clients and I
tended to assume such processes would not offer a fair hearing to the
employees.
Once I became a law professor, in 1992, my perspective on the
use of dispute resolution in the employment context began to change.
I had always seen that litigation was often a very undesirable dispute
resolution mechanism for many of my clients,1 o and I was also sure
Cas. (BNA) 1366 (E.D. Pa. 1988). I settled another case after obtaining a ruling that the plaintiff
was entitled to a jury trial rather than a bench trial as had been asserted by the defendant.
Welcker v. Smithkline Beckman, 746 F. Supp. 576, 581-82 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (finding that although
Pennsylvania courts had ruled that claims under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act did not
give rise to a jury right, the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution nonetheless afforded
plaintiff a jury trial if she brought her state statutory claim in federal court).
307. In eight years of employment practice I recall attending one preliminary mediation
conference and conducting one arbitration. At the mediation conference the volunteer mediator
asked both sides if we thought mediation would be productive and when we said "no," he said
to call him if we changed our minds. The arbitration was conducted in a claim for unpaid
overtime, brought in federal court, and I am not sure at this point why the claim went to
arbitration.
308. When I was in practice both plaintiff-side and defense-side employment attorneys
typically assumed that Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) precluded the use
of mandatory arbitration in employment cases. Although Alexander was a case that arose in the
collective bargaining rather than individual context, it was thought that the public policy
concerns expressed by the Court with respect to arbitrating discrimination claims would apply to
individual suits as well. Just as I was leaving practice, in 1991, the Court handed down Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). By deciding, in Gilmer, that a securities firm
could require its members to resolve age discrimination complaints through mandatory
arbitration, the Court inspired many companies outside the securities industry to begin to
include mandatory arbitration clauses in their contracts and handbooks as well.
309. Today many plaintiff-side employment attorneys are enthusiastic about mediation. For
example Joseph D. Garrison, a former president of the National Employment Lawyers'
Association (plaintiff-side employment attorneys) has written a book chapter endorsing the use
of mediation in many situations. Joseph D. Garrison, Employment Mediation: The Employee's
Perspective, in MEDIATION PRACTICE BOOK: CRITICAL TOOLS, TECHNIQUES, AND FORMS 347
(Harry D. Mazadoorian ed., 2002), available at <http://www.garrisonlaw.comlarticles.php#11>
(last viewed June 10, 2007). Another well known plaintiff-side attorney, Wayne Outten, states
that "[a]n attorney representing employees - or employers - should consciously consider
mediation in virtually every significant employment dispute that cannot be resolved through
direct negotiations. Wayne R. Outten, Mediation of Employment Disputes, <http://www.outten
golden.com/files/MediationofEmploymentDisputes.pdf> (last visited May 31, 2007).
310. Despite my best efforts, many of my clients did not ultimately prevail in litigation. But,
even more troubling, I saw that even when my clients prevailed on the merits, it was not clear
that litigation had improved their overall situation. I recall multiple clients who "won" at trial
but ended up having to pay more in costs and fees than they had won. I also recall clients who
won and even came out ahead, financially, but who suffered severe family or health problems,
likely attributable to the stress of litigation. I also observed that clients who chose to sue their
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that employers did not like it much either.3 1' As an academic I began
to think about which if any dispute resolution processes might be used
to improve the existing state of affairs.
For a time I focused my scholarship on an option I was sure was
even worse for employees than litigation: mandatory binding
arbitration.3 1 2 I then decided to take a more upbeat approach and
consider how the resolution of employment disputes in the U.S. might
be improved.313
II. THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES
IN THE U.S.
When one thinks about how we resolve individual employment
discrimination disputes3 14 in the U.S., from a dispute resolution
perspective, one realizes that our system is quite complex, and really
something of a hodge-podge.3 1' We use six basic approaches, often
interwoven, to resolve individual claims of employment
discrimination.
former employer often had a very tough time trying to get another job in the same field as the
former employer.
311. Employers have long complained of the high costs of defense, even in suits where they
have no liability. Employers' costs include not only lawyers' fees and costs, but also damage to
company reputation, damage to company morale, and lost work time because employees and
managers have to devote their attention to the lawsuit. For some discussion of employers' costs
see Sherwyn et al., supra note 193, at 81-83.
312. See, e.g., Sternlight, Arbitration Meets Class Action, supra note 207, at 1 (demonstrating
that use of mandatory binding arbitration may permit companies to protect themselves from suit
in class actions); Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the
Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 669 (2001)
[hereinafter Sternlight, Demise of the Seventh Amendment] (arguing that privately imposing
binding arbitration may violate the Seventh Amendment); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or
Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH.
U. L. Q. 637 (1996) (attacking private mandatory binding arbitration from a policy perspective);
Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for
Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers and Due Process
Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1 (1997) (arguing that private mandatory arbitration may be
unconstitutional).
313. See Sternlight, In Search of Best Procedure, supra note 110.
314. My focus here is on claims brought by individual employees (as opposed to classes of
employees) who are not members of a labor union.
315. Wikipedia states that:
"H3dge-podge" or "hotchpotch" or "hotch pot" is an English expression often used
negatively, denoting a "mixture" or "medley" of things. According to the Concise
Oxford Dictionary it is derived from the Middle English word hochepot and it is a:
"Dish of many mixed ingredients, especially mutton broth with vegetables. This
meaning of the word can still be found in the Dutch word "hutspot" (a dish of mashed
potatoes with carrots and onions).
Wikipedia.org, Hodge-Podge, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilHodge-Podge> (last visited May 31,
2007).
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As I learned first-hand in practice, many persons who believe
they have been discriminated against on the job take little or no legal
action whatsoever, instead opting to "lump" the harm that they have
suffered. This is often a rational choice, even when employees have
been victimized by illegal actions, because the financial, emotional,
and reputational costs of pursuing a legal claim can exceed any
projected gains from bringing a lawsuit.
A second mechanism is employers' own dispute resolution
programs. These vary a great deal along a series of dimensions
ranging from voluntary to mandatory,"' formal to informal,317 and
purely internal to external dispute resolvers.3 18
Third, employers are typically required to file complaints of
discrimination with a federal or state agency prior to bringing a
lawsuit in court.319 Such agencies may ultimately make a finding of
discrimination and, if the employer does not settle, bring a lawsuit on
the employee's behalf to obtain relief.320 Such lawsuits are extremely
rare.3 21 When the EEOC does not litigate on an employee's behalf,
the employee is free to litigate his or her own claim in court.322
316. Some employers require that employees exhaust internal dispute resolution options
before bringing a complaint to a federal or state agency or to court.
317. Some companies may simply recommend that employees bring complaints to a human
relations employee; others have a much more formal mediation or hearing process.
318. Some employers may provide an ombudsperson to help resolve disputes, and make
efforts to insulate that ombudsperson from pressures to favor the employer. See, e.g., Susan
Sturm, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change, 2007 J. DISP. RES. 1 (discussing ombuds
process used by National Institute of Health); see also contributions to these proceedings by
Susan Bisom-Rapp, supra at 141-147, and Michael Z. Green, supra at 154-204.
319. For a general description of the administrative process see Sternlight, In Search of Best
Procedure, supra note 110, at 1410-21. Federal anti-discrimination statutes typically require
employees to file claims with the EEOC prior to filing a claim of discrimination in court.
Because of "worksharing agreements" employees often have the option to file their claim with a
state agency rather than with the EEOC. The filing deadlines for filing these administrative
claims are short, typically less than a year. Some have argued that the administrative process,
while perhaps intended to help employees receive effective relief, in fact serves more as a
hindrance than an aid to employees. See Selmi, supra note 66, at 64 ("Whatever the EEOC's
original mission, and whatever the original hope, today the agency is clearly a failure, serving in
some instances as little more than an administrative obstacle to resolution of claims on the
merits.").
320. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 286-88 (2002) (discussing legislative
history and policy underlying statutory provisions that allow agency to file lawsuit on
employee's behalf).
321. EEOC reports that 56,155 charges of discrimination in violation of Title VII were filed
with the agency in 2006. EEOC, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges,
<http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/vii.html> (last viewed May 31, 2007). The agency filed just 294
lawsuits alleging Title VII violations in 2006. EEOC Litigation Statistics, <http://www.eeoc.gov
/stats/litigation.html> (last viewed May 31, 2007).
322. Employees are free to litigate claims in which the EEOC has found reasonable cause to
believe discrimination, no reasonable cause to believe discrimination occurred, or simply closed
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Fourth, employees and employers are increasingly seeking to
mediate resolution to employees' discrimination claims. Some of this
mediation may occur under the auspices of the EEOC, which now
sends certain claims to mediation.3 23 Also, mediation may occur
because employees signed predispute agreements to mediate,
because courts order or suggest mediation, or because employer and
employee voluntarily agree to mediation, post-dispute.
Fifth, litigation remains a common form of dispute resolution for
employment discrimination claims in the United States.324 When
employment discrimination disputes are litigated, the disputants are
often entitled to a jury trial.325 While most litigated employment
discrimination disputes ultimately settle, settlements often occur after
substantial discovery and pretrial litigation has occurred.326
In short, although the U.S. hosts a broad array of dispute
resolution processes, the overall success of these processes is quite
limited. It is well recognized that claimants' ability to bring
complaints is limited, and that it is difficult for disputants to reach a
speedy resolution of the complaints. Also, our dispute resolution
processes are quite costly for both employees and employers. From a
financial perspective, both employees and employers often have to
expend large sums attempting to resolve disputes through litigation.
In addition, our processes impose high emotional and morale costs on
employees and employers.
the case administratively without making a finding. EEOC's findings have no binding effect in
court. See generally Selmi, supra note 67, at 9. In 2006 the EEOC found cause in 5.5 percent of
Title VII cases, no reasonable cause in 61.4 percent of Title VII cases, and administratively
closed 16.2 percent of cases. See <http://www/eeoc.gov/stats/vii.html> (last visited June 21,
2007).
323. See supra notes 35-59 and accompanying text (containing the comments of E. Patrick
McDermott, for discussion of the EEOC mediation program); see also Sternlight, supra note
110, at 1417-21.
324. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reports that in the twelve-month period
ending September 30, 2006, nearly 6 percent of the cases filed in federal court related to
employment discrimination. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS app. tbl. C-2A, available at <http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/appendices/c2a.pdf>
(last visited June 10, 2007).
325. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
provide for compensatory and punitive damages, and hence also a jury trial. Pub. L. No. 102-
166, 105 Stat. 1071 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., with these remedial
sections referred to at 42 U.S.C. H§ 1981 (a)(1), (c) (2000)).
326. For a harsh critique of the U.S. system see Sherwyn et al., supra note 193, at 97-98
("Federal litigation is a heart-wrenching marathon that no one enjoys and many people simply
cannot tolerate.").
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III. THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES
IN OTHER COUNTRIES
Dissatisfied with the amalgam of processes used to resolve
employment discrimination claims in the United States, I decided that
rather than reinvent the wheel I would look at some other countries'
approaches to see what we might learn. In particular, I decided to
examine how Great Britain and Australia resolve such claims. I chose
to focus on Great Britain and Australia because these countries are
culturally and linguistically quite similar to the United States. Also,
the substantive anti-discrimination laws in Australia and Great
Britain are fairly similar to our own.'
A. Great Britain
The British rely primarily on two mechanisms for resolving
employment discrimination claims: employment tribunals and
conciliation. The British chose to use tribunals to resolve
discrimination claims because they hoped the tribunals would be
more accessible, speedy, informal, and inexpensive than courts.32
Three-person panels, including one attorney and two "lay"
members,32 9 hear claims in a setting that, while adjudicative, is
supposed to be less formal than a courtroom proceeding.330 The
hearings in discrimination cases generally take two to three days.33 '
Disputants who are dissatisfied can appeal tribunal rulings to the
Employment Appeals Tribunal.332
While the trial tribunals have jurisdiction to resolve most British
employment discrimination claims, the bulk of disputes are resolved
prior to a hearing through "conciliation." A government agency
called Acas333 offers both sides in employment disputes the
opportunity to resolve the matter prior to the tribunal hearing.
According to the 2005/06 Acas Annual Report, 80 percent of
327. See Sternlight, In Search of Best Procedure, supra note 110, at 1404-05.
328. See id. at 1431-32 (discussing British Donovan Commission's recommendation that
system of tribunals would provide accessible, informal, inexpensive and speedy justice for
employment discrimination disputes).
329. See id. at 1432-33.
330. Id. at 1433.
331. Id. at 1434.
332. Id.
333. Acas stands for Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Services. <http://www.acas.
org.uk/index.aspx?articleid=332> (last viewed June 10, 2007).
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discrimination claims were either settled or withdrawn,3 34 as compared
to 11 percent that were resolved at the tribunal stage.335 Typically the
conciliator discusses the claims and defenses separately with each
side, and often by phone."'
Interestingly the British system has been critiqued on the
grounds both that it is too legal and adversarial and that it is too
informal. One set of critics finds that the tribunals, although intended
to be quick, cheap, accessible, and informal, have increasingly come
to resemble courts.337 At the same time, other critics worry that rights
cannot be vindicated adequately through the tribunal and conciliation
approaches.338
B. Australia
In Australia the federal Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission (HREOC) is the most important body charged with
administering antidiscrimination legislation,339 with comparable state
agencies also playing important roles. Pursuant to statute these
agencies seeks to use "conciliation" as the primary technique for
resolving claims of employment discrimination.3 40 In conciliation, an
agency representative seeks to bring both sides together and help
them to resolve the complaint informally. 4' Australian policymakers
334. Acas Annual Reports and Accounts 2005/06, available at <http://www.acas.org.uk
/media/pdf/7/0/Annual-report_2005_2006.pdf> (last viewed May 31, 2007). To calculate these
statistics I totaled claims for sex discrimination, race discrimination, disability discrimination,
and equal pay. Other reported statistics appeared to cover employment claims for something
other than discrimination.
335. Id.
336. Sternlight, In Search of Best Procedure, supra note 110, at 1435.
337. Id. at 1437-40.
338. Id. at 1440-41.
339. For a general description of this agency see Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Comm'n, About the Commission, <http://www.hreoc.gov.au/about-the-commission/index.
html> (last viewed May 2, 2007).
340. Sternlight, In Search of Best Procedure, supra note 110, at 1452-53.
341. The HREOC web site discusses conciliation as follows:
Where it appears a complaint can be resolved by the parties we will try to help them
reach an agreement that will settle the complaint in a fair way. We may do this by
bringing the parties together in a "conciliation conference" which is an informal,
impartial and private process. The conciliation officer will set the standards for the
conference and will discuss these with both parties before the conference. At the
conference, both parties will have the chance to talk about the issues raised in the
complaint and discuss solutions. If the conciliation officer agrees you may have a
lawyer, advocate or support person at the conciliation conference. It is not necessary
for you to be represented by a lawyer but if you do have a lawyer, you must pay for the
lawyer yourself.
Conciliation processes are flexible and sometimes matters may be settled by
exchange of letters, telephone negotiation through the officer handling the matter, or
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chose to emphasize conciliation because they believed that it would
provide relatively easy, speedy, low-cost access, achieve positive
durable creative solutions, empower the disputants, and provide a
dignified process.342
Although the term "conciliation" is legislatively used in all the
Australian anti-discrimination statutes, it is not defined.343 Studies of
the technique have revealed substantial variation among government
agencies,34 but consensus at least on the idea that conciliation is a
settlement technique. Conciliators neither decide cases nor issue
orders, but instead assist the disputants in resolving their
differences."
To the extent that complaints of discrimination are not either
resolved through conciliation or withdrawn, they can be litigated by
the charging parties.346 It appears that approximately 12 percent of the
complaints filed with the federal HREOC are eventually filed in
court.347 To the extent that claims are settled, conciliated, or
by a telephone conciliation conference.
<http://www.hreoc.gov.au/complaints-information/parties/respondents.html> (last viewed May
2, 2007).
342. See, e.g., Anna Chapman, Discrimination Complaint-Handling in NSW: The Paradox of
Informal Dispute Resolution, 22 SYDNEY L. REV. 321, 321-22 (2000); Annmarie Devereux,
Human Rights by Agreement? A Case Study of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission's Use of Conciliation, 7 AUSTL. DiSP. RESOL. J. 280, 283 (1996).
343. E.g., Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, § 23(2) (Austl.); Sex Discrimination Act, 1984, §
73 (Austl.); Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act, 1986, § 46PF (Austl.),
amended by Human Rights Legislation Amendment Act No. 1, 1999 (Austl.).
344. E.g., HILARY ASTOR & CHRISTINE M. CHINKIN, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AUSTRALIA
371-73 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining how various government agencies handle complaints and
noting that "a wide range of styles and practices is used"); Rosemary Hunter & Alice Leonard,
The Outcomes of Conciliation in Sex Discrimination Cases 1, 11-16 (Univ. of Melbourne Ctr.
For Employment & Labour Relations Law, Working Paper No. 8, 1995).
345. Conciliators are typically empowered to conduct investigations, but the usual
investigations appear to be quite minimal. Thus, the conciliator's primary focus is on attempting
to achieve settlements, through various means. While one might assume that conciliators would
typically bring disputants together in face-to-face meetings, in fact studies have shown that
Australian conciliation attempts often involve independent communications between the
conciliator and each side. For more detail on the conciliation process see Sternlight, In Search of
Best Procedure, supra note 110, at 1453-58.
346. At an earlier time, such claims at the federal level were often brought to a specialized
administrative tribunal. However, a federal decision, Brandy v. Human Rights & Equal
Opportunity Commission, 183 C.L.R. 245, 267 (1995) held that delegating judicial power to a
government agency violated the Australian constitution's anti-delegation provision. Thus,
complainants now have the option to file their claims in court. For a report discussing this
change, and its impact, see AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, FIVE YEARS ON: AN UPDATE TO THE COMPLAINT HANDLING WORK OF THE
HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, available at <http://www.human
rights.gov.au/complaints-information/publications/five-years on.html> (last updated Dec. 7,
2005).
347. In 2004, 1036 discrimination complaints were filed with the HREOC and 130
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withdrawn, complainants typically obtain small monetary awards.348
However, such settlements may often include non-monetary features
such as apologies.349 While one may speculate that those cases that are
litigated may result in somewhat larger monetary awards, this author
is not aware of studies on this point.
Australians' reaction to their system, which combines informal
and formal processes, has been mixed. Specifically, opinions differ as
to whether the informality apparently sought by the legislature has
been achieved, and as to whether this informality is indeed desirable.
Some have observed a phenomenon of "creeping adversarialism" in
agency hearings intended to be informal.5 Others fear that while
attempts to maintain informal practices may have succeeded, such
informality may have given unfair advantage to companies over their
employees."'
IV. LESSONS LEARNED FROM COMPARING DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PROCESSES IN THREE COUNTRIES
The comparison of three countries' approaches to employment
discrimination disputes has yielded several key insights. None of the
three countries has yet found what all policymakers would agree is an
ideal system for resolving these disputes. Instead, each country's
approach can best be described as a work-in-progress. Thus, while our
comparison has not found a perfect system that U.S. policymakers
can simply copy, at least we can gain some small comfort in seeing
that other countries, like us, are struggling to search for a good means
of resolving such disputes.
For me the most fascinating insight was to realize that like the
discrimination claims were filed in an Australian federal court. See AUSTRALIAN HUMAN
RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, supra note 347, § 2.2 tbl. 1, § 2.6 tbl. 7. The
numbers reported for 2001-2003 are similar.
348. In 2002, 2003 and 2004 the median amount obtained through conciliation at the
HREOC was $5000. AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
supra note 347, § 2.4 tbl. 4. Presumably when claims are withdrawn claimants receive no
compensation, or certainly a lesser amount than if they conciliate their claims.
349. Chapter 4 of the HREOC Annual Report for 2005-2006 discusses the resolutions
achieved in many conciliated cases and shows that apologies, statements of regret, and changes
in management practices were often achieved. AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006, at 49-89 (2006), available at
<http://www.humanrights.gov.au/pdf/annual-reports/HREOC AnnualReport_0506.pdf> (last
viewed June 10, 2007); see also Sternlight, In Search of Best Procedure, supra note 110, at 1457-
58 (discussing additional studies of nature of conciliation agreements).
350. Sternlight, In Search of Best Procedure, supra note 110, at 1459-60.
351. Id. at 1460.
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U.S., Britain and Australia have tended to cycle or oscillate between
formal and informal approaches as they have searched for a good
means to resolve employment discrimination complaints. That is,
countries may for a while try a highly formalized litigation approach
but will then realize that such an approach, while beneficial in the
sense of finding all the facts and explicating the law, is inevitably slow
and costly. When countries then turn to more informal approaches,
such as administrative processes, conciliation, or mediation, two
things typically happen. First, the informal processes often tend to
become more formal, as claimants seek to present their claims under
the law and respondents seek to offer legal defenses. Second, to the
extent that processes remain informal, commentators worry that
claimants' rights are not being adequately protected and that the law
is not being sufficiently elaborated.
At one level this cycling is based on some unique features of
employment law. In a prior article I laid out ten special features of
employment disputes that tend to make them particularly difficult to
resolve.352 Once these features have been laid out it is easy to see why
it has been so tough to find the right process for resolving these
complaints, in that the goals are often in tension with one another.
The public interest in full investigation and creation of precedent
dictates in favor of a full-blown litigation process. Yet, many of the
private interests, such as in resolving disputes quickly and cheaply,
dictate in favor of informal approaches such as conciliation or
mediation.353
Moreover, the sort of cycling I observed is not unique to
employment disputes. Rather, over time and across jurisdictional
borders, commentators have observed a similar phenomenon.
Whereas formal rule-based systems can potentially offer more
certainty and transparency than other approaches, such systems are
352. Id. at 1467-82. The ten features were: (1) laws prohibiting discrimination tend to be
quite complex; (2) facts pertinent to claims of discrimination are often highly contested and
confusing; (3) disputes regarding employment discrimination tend to involve significant nonlegal
as well as legal interests; (4) society has a need for correct determinations of legal claims of
employment discrimination; (5) society has a need for clear and public precedents to deter
future wrongdoers and let persons know what conduct is permissible; (6) victims of
discrimination must be adequate compensated; (7) many societies have a further interest in
punishing wrongdoers; (8) alleged victims of discrimination must have adequate access to a
procedural mechanism that allows them to assert their claims; (9) employment discrimination
claims must be resolved quickly in order to permit all persons involved to get on with their lives
and business; and (10) alleged victims of discrimination tend to have fewer resources than do
alleged perpetrators of discrimination. Id.
353. Id. at 1485-89.
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frequently slow, costly, and may fail to distinguish individual
circumstances. On the other hand, informal dispute resolution
mechanisms, while potentially offering the benefits of speed, low-cost,
and individualization, typically won't provide the full investigation
nor precedential benefits of a formal system. In the United States,
writing in 1906, Roscoe Pound described what he called the
"oscillation" between rules and discretion, which I believe is one
variant on this larger phenomenon.
The most important and most constant cause of dissatisfaction
with all law at all times is to be found in the necessarily mechanical
operation of legal rules.... Legal history shows an oscillation
between wide judicial discretion on the one hand and strict
confinement of the magistrate by minute and detailed rules upon
the other hand.354
More recently, two current American commentators, Tom Main
and Jackie Nolan-Haley, have urged that both the older British
law/equity distinction and the current litigation/ADR divide are
similarly reflective of the tension between formal and informal, public
and private approaches."'
There is also reason to believe that this tension exists in societies
quite different from our own. Professor Frank Upham, reviewing a
book by Zhu Suli, the dean of Beijing University School of Law,356
discusses recent developments in China regarding formal and
informal law.357 According to Upham, Zhu calls upon China to
emphasize its own native legal resources rather than to adopt,
wholesale, western rule-of-law approaches. In an essay entitled Who
Will Find the Defendant if he Stays with his Sheep?: Justice in Rural
China," Upham urges that "[t]he solution [to the tension Zhu
354. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
40 AM. L. REV. 729, 731 (1906).
355. Thomas 0. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 329, 329-30 (2005) (urging
that just as the British system of equity sought to relieve problems and tensions created by the
strict common-law approach, ADR today is a release for pressures created by our formal
litigation system); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, The Merger of Law and Mediation: Lessons from
Equity Jurisprudence and Roscoe Pound, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 57, 58-59 (2004)
("Both equity and mediation offer a form of 'individualized justice' unavailable in the official
legal system, and each allow room for mercy in an otherwise rigid, rule-bound justice system.").
356. Zhu's book was entitled, as interpreted, SENDING LAW TO THE COUNTRYSIDE:
RESEARCH ON CHINA'S BASIC-LEVEL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2000).
357. Frank K. Upham, Who Will Find the Defendant if he Stays With his Sheep? 114 YALE
L.J. 1675 (2005).
358. This title comes from an anecdote having to do with how a collections action can be
brought against a villager who is a shepherd who spends most of his time on the outskirts of the
town with his sheep. Zhu observes that while the court president and his entourage could come
to the village, to facilitate collection, they were reliant on the assistance of members of the local
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describes between alternative legal approaches], therefore, may be to
institutionalize the dialectic that Zhu describes between formal and
informal, modern and customary, center and periphery in a manner
designed to make the norms created more accessible to the public
while also being respectful of local practices."35 9 While Professor
Upham and Dean Zhu are not discussing employment discrimination,
likely the tensions between formal and informal practices exist in
China in that realm as well.
V. CONCLUSIONS
My study of the processes by which employment discrimination
claims are resolved in the United States and elsewhere have led me to
draw three major conclusions that may be useful to policymakers.
First, given the tensions between the benefits and detriments of
formal and informal systems, I believe it is a mistake to look for a
single best procedure for resolving employment discrimination claims.
Instead, we should try to blend several different processes to provide
the mix of benefits that best serves the interests of both disputants
and society.
Second, the fact that a blend of processes may be best does not
mean that we need to use the current hodge-podge approach, nor that
all processes are created equal. Instead, we should pick a few
processes that seem best suited to serve the various public and private
interests that have been identified. For example, I have concluded
that privately imposing mandatory arbitration on employees does not
serve appropriate interests of either society or disputants, so I would
not include that process in my ideal system. On the other hand, face-
to-face mediation can be a terrific way to resolve employment
discrimination disputes quickly, cheaply, and effectively, and full-
blown litigation can be an excellent device to fully probe disputed
facts, develop complex law, and educate the public as to the meaning
of our laws.3 60
Third, once at least two good methods of dispute resolution have
been identified, we must also figure out who should decide which
disputes should be sent to which process. Here I have no easy answer,
village to bring the defendant to town for his hearing. The central government has only tenuous
power, in Zhu's view, as it seeks to send law to the countryside. Id. at 1680.
359. Id. at 1714.
360. I spell out this conclusion in greater detail in Sternlight, In Search of Best Procedure,
supra note 110, at 1490-95.
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but I do at least have an insight. My insight is that we can't rely on the
disputants, alone, to make this important "tracking" decision, because
we cannot expect disputants to protect societal interests. Even if
disputants were to conclude, in every situation, that mediation would
be the best dispute resolution mechanism for resolving their
employment discrimination dispute, I would still believe that certain
disputes ought to be resolved in a different more public manner, such
*361
as litigation.
While there is much to criticize in the U.S. hodge-podge of
procedures for resolving employment discrimination complaints, we
have at least implicitly recognized that the public, as well as
disputants themselves, has an interest in what procedure is used. In
particular, the EEOC is empowered to bring enforcement actions that
serve the interests of the public.362 In EEOC v. Waffle House,363 the
Supreme Court carefully explained that because the EEOC serves
public as well as private interests, the EEOC and not the claimant is
the master of the process.364 In that case, the Supreme Court therefore
made clear that even if an individual agrees to resolve employment
discrimination claims exclusively through binding arbitration, the
EEOC may still pursue a claim in litigation seeking victim-specific
and injunctive relief that would assist that individual.365
Placing the reality of employment discrimination disputes in a
comparative context is useful both because we can learn both what
seem to be some enduring features of these disputes, and because we
can consider how other societies have attempted to resolve these
claims. My own research, while I hope informative, has been quite
preliminary, and has only examined a few other countries'
approaches. By expanding this project I believe that we can get a
better sense of which features of the United States system are worth
361. Id. at 1495-96; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A
Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2696
(1995) (explaining that to the extent disputants "own" their own disputes they should be the
ones who have the power to decide on a dispute resolution mechanism, but to the extent that
society as a whole has an interest it should be the society that chooses the dispute resolution
mechanism).
362. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 286 (2002) (discussing EEOC's
enforcement role); Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 332-33 (1980) (recognizing the
difference between the EEOC's enforcement role and an individual employee's private cause of
action).
363. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 279.
364. Id. at 291. The Court provides various examples of how procedural and other limits
such as statutes of limitations may apply to the claimant, but not necessarily the agency, because
the EEOC is not merely a proxy for the individual employee. Id. at 287-88.
365. Id. at 295. The Court did, however, proscribe double recoveries. Id. at 296.
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preserving and protecting, and which we might better jettison. For
example, as I have written elsewhere I think it is significant that the
phenomenon of privately imposed binding arbitration is basically
unique to the United States.'6 Although uniqueness per se is not
damning,36 7 in this case it is noteworthy that other countries have
considered and then rejected the advisability of permitting privately
imposed binding arbitration.6
Having good and strong laws proscribing employment
discrimination is important, but such laws cannot ensure a fair
workplace until we can also establish good and fair procedures for
implementing these laws.'69 Considering how other countries have
implemented their own employment discrimination laws will help us
to provide justice in the workplace in the United States.
366. Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb?: Comparing the U.S. Approach to
Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 831 (2002) [hereinafter Sternlight, Out on a Limb].
367. Someone or some country is often first, if not alone, in discovering a new positive
advance. See generally Stephen J. Ware, Consumer and Employment Arbitration Law in
Comparative Perspective: The Importance of the Civil Jury, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 865 (2002)
(responding to and critiquing my argument that the uniqueness of private mandatory binding
arbitration in the U.S. is one reason to believe that the practice is unwise).
368. Sternlight, Out on a Limb, supra note 366, at 848-50 (discussing work of the European
Union).
369. "I'll let you write the substance ... and you let me write the procedure, and I'll screw
you everytime." (statement of Rep. John Dingell) Hearing on H.R. 2327 before the Subcomm.
On Admin. Law and Government Regulations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong.
312 (1983). (statement of Rep. John Dingell).
